THE YANKS ARE STRIKING: KERN COUNTY, THE 1921 OIL STRIKE
AND THE DISCOURSE ON AMERICANISM

A Thesis
presented to
the Faculty of California Polytechnic State University,
San Luis Obispo

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts in History

by
Peter Hussey
June 2020

Ⓒ 2020
Peter Hussey
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

ii

COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP

TITLE:

The Yanks Are Striking: Kern
County, the 1921 Oil Strike and
the Discourse on Americanism

AUTHOR:

Peter Hussey

DATE SUBMITTED:

June 2020

COMMITTEE CHAIR:

Andrew D. Morris, Ph.D.
Professor of History

COMMITTEE MEMBER:

Sarah Bridger, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of History

COMMITTEE MEMBER:

Elizabeth Sine, Ph.D.
Lecturer of History

iii

ABSTRACT
The Yanks Are Striking: Kern County, the 1921 Oil Strike and the Discourse on
Americanism
Peter Hussey

In the fall of 1921 oil workers of the San Joaquin Valley faced a post-war
economic slump, wage cuts across the board and an increasingly hostile attitude
of oil operators towards consultation with the federal government on labor
relations. They voted to strike, and the next day eight thousand workers walked
off the fields. Strikers crafted an image of “patriotic unionism,” underpinned by a
faith in the federal government and the ideology of the American Legion. The
strike did not end in gruesome class warfare like had been seen months earlier in
the coal mines of West Virginia, but rather in ideological confusion and despair.
The oil workers movement never fully embraced a class identity; instead it
embraced the burgeoning conservative identity of Americanism. This effectively
hobbled the growth of the movement. Upon the strike’s conclusion there was no
mass pull to the left on the part of oil workers in the San Joaquin Valley, despite
the fact that their movement’s design and identity had gotten them nowhere. On
the contrary a portion of workers and supporters of the strike turned to the
nativism of the Klan. Overall this project looks to complicate the narrative of “us
vs. them” in labor history by analyzing workers’ identities, and also looks to
contribute to the ever-evolving discourse on how historians should track
American conservatism as a social force.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
If you were to drive from California’s Yosemite Valley to the Central Coast,
you would most likely take State Route 41. It is an unusual stretch of highway,
one that takes its motorists through a myriad of landscapes, from ponderosa pine
to the coastal piers that protrude into the Pacific. As you leave the seemingly
infinite flatness of the San Joaquin Valley headed southwest, the landscape
changes into a rolling hill country and for a brief moment you pass into the
northwestern tip of Kern County. This point demarcates the north door into an
underground sea of oil that still flows today. This sea stretches from Devil’s Den
south, buttressing the hills all the way down to Maricopa.
Wallace Morgan prefaced his historical survey of the region by reminding
us that Kern County should first and foremost be thought of as a place of
immense pursuit. It offered cheap land and plenty of it, land ripe with resources
only in need of toil. He stated, “Think of such manifest richness as this and
understand what dreams the pioneers indulged in, what cupidity and greed of
gain were fostered, what clashes of strong, aggressive, resourceful men the
scramble to possess these bounties of nature brought about.”1 Of course, writing
in 1914, Morgan was aware of the fact that these riches were not meant for all,
they were “locked with locks that golden keys alone could open.”2 Similarly
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Upton Sinclair compared the oil game to heaven, “where many are called and
few are chosen.”3
By 1914, the Kern County oil industry had more semblance of competition
than prior to the breakup of Standard; however, giants still loomed large in the
market, and they held the “golden keys.” Standard Oil of California, Union,
California Petroleum Company, Associated and Pacific Oil Companies and
others owned and operated the oil fields from Maricopa north to Coalinga. In
September of 1921 the oil workers of western Kern County faced a post-war
economic slump, wage cuts across the board and the increasingly hostile attitude
of oil operators towards consultation with the federal government on labor
relations. On September 10 the oil workers voted to strike.
1.1 The State of Labor in the Industry
They did so as members of the International Association of Oil Field, Gas
Well and Refinery Workers of America, which was granted its union charter from
the AFL in 1918. Prior to this oil workers’ unions were comparatively small and
diffuse. They were products of the industry’s migratory nature as well as the iron
grip of Standard Oil.4 Workers would frequently need to move from lease to
lease due to market fluctuations, overproduction or the discovery of new fields.5
The “first major strike in oil” was in 1905 outside Beaumont, Texas. It
managed to stave off a wage cut, but gained only minor temporary traction for
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4

2

unionism in the region.6 There was another in 1916 in Bayonne, New Jersey, but
it ended even worse with nine strikers shot dead and fifty more wounded.7
Similarly in California, oil strikes and union drives largely floundered right up till
1917.8 Harvey O'Connor noted that “when a man talked union he was turned
right out of camp.”9 This changed with the onset of a wartime economy.
By 1918 and under AFL recognition, Locals sprang up throughout Kern
County, particularly down the “‘Ridge’ along the western border of the Valley.”10
Locals also blossomed in Texas and Los Angeles. These were all capable of
immense variation in terms of strategy as well as rank and file ideology.
Whereas the Texas Locals had struck during the war, along with other industries,
and Long Beach Local 128 had grown a reputation for radicalist sympathies, the
San Joaquin Valley locals were proud to have not struck during wartime and
grew increasingly conservative and ingrown.11 The relationship between the Los
Angeles locals and those of the San Joaquin Valley will be fleshed out in later
chapters, but it should be noted up front that when the Kern County oil workers
went on strike in 1921, they did it alone.
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1.2 The Kern County Strike
Thousands of workers walked off the fields that fall quickly establishing a
strike zone, and oil operators beheld the “specter of a workers’ state.”12 Broadly
speaking, the oil workers movement can be seen as one of the last major strikes
of 1919-1922 “wave” before labor fell into the “lean years” of the decade.13
However, it contradicts neat categorization and placement alongside other
moments of labor unrest. Quam-Wickham briefly concludes that the union and
their 1921 strike had “developed a critique of oil’s political economy that involved
issues far beyond traditional labor concerns.”14
They did this through abandoning material “shop floor” objectives such as
reducing wage cuts, demanding union recognition and safer working conditions.
Instead they called for federal government oversight akin to that which they had
experienced through the war period. They articulated a deep faith in the
government that would not be infused with labor demands until the development
of the CIO in the 1930s. This faith arose out of WWI and the Wilsonian era, both
of which had fundamentally altered the relationship between Americans and the
federal government. The sentiment was that if the government had the power to
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engage in conscription and demand intense loyalty to the war effort then it should
also have the ability to support Americans after the war’s conclusion.15
The Wilson administration heavily supervised the oil industry’s spheres of
labor relations, public leases and pollution control.16 For oil workers these were
the good old days now under threat. Strikers crafted an image of “patriotic
unionism,” underpinned by a faith in the federal government, but also by the
conservatism of the American Legion. The adoption of this ideology was
unquestionable and an integral part of the strike’s design from the onset. Strikers
adorned “badges of red, white and blue,” enforced prohibition and gambling laws,
disdained radicalism and immigration, and “pinned their faith to Uncle Sam’s
signature.”17
The strike had a unique ability to reach beyond immediate economic
conditions and garner local political support; in that sense it had features more
akin to a social movement.18 The strike lasted six weeks and paralyzed the state
oil industry, but ultimately ended in defeat for the oil workers who were left to
either return to work in Kern County under worse conditions than had existed
before or migrate south to the oil fields of Los Angeles.
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1.3 The Design of the Strike
Labor historians such as Lawrence Goodwyn often argue that we ought to
be wary of fixating on the “condescension of the past.”19 We usually study strikes
to see what went wrong. The bulk of the historiography on the 1921 Kern County
Oil Strike falls into this tendency. The strike was seen as “ephemeral,” a “dismal
failure,” and “wrought with saboteurs.”20 These all have varying degrees of
validity; however, the strike was most hobbled by its own internal principles, how
the strikers defined themselves and their objectives. Without looking to
condescend to the oil workers, it still remains important to properly contextualize
their movement, and identify why the strike unfolded the way it did.
The fact that Legionnaires comprised a vast portion of the rank and file
and were able to overwhelmingly dominate the discourse between strikers,
operators and the government is crucial. However, this is not unique, the West
Virginia Coal Wars months earlier also contained a significant number of veteran
strikers. In many ways these two strikes offer an insightful comparative analysis.
They were underlaid by the seismic shift in industry from coal to petroleum-based
fuel, they arose out of the post-WWI economic downturn and they were both
carried out with highly organized military tactics. These features appear to make
the two strikes commensurable, however, the nature of the struggles that ensued
were quite different.

19
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The Coal Mine Strike of 1921 was characterized by WWI veterans on both
sides of the conflict. Unlike the situation in Kern County, there existed a local
social buffer between the strikers and the mine owners. This antagonistic middle
class throughout Mingo County, West Virginia was composed of lawyers, clerks,
physicians, clergymen, contractors, car salesmen, bookkeepers, insurance men,
merchants and American Legionnaires.21 This material shoring up of two
oppositional forces, along with a multitude of other factors like Appalachian
company town life, led to an unprecedented level of violence and bloodshed
throughout the Coal Mine War period.
Not but a month later, the Kern County Oil Strike would supposedly boast
an inversion of that picture. Quam-Wickham noted that by late September
newspapers were describing it as “the most moral and sober strike ever pulled.”22
This was a strike of immense peculiarity in terms of who the bulk of the workers
were and what the nature of their ideology was. Unlike the Mingo County middle
class that stood in fierce opposition to strikers, the Kern County Oil strike was
able to placate the local population to a certain degree. The strike was so
comprehensive that it managed to become an active economic and political force
in the region. Local businesses and professionals that did not support the strike
were boycotted and local political offices including the sheriff and district attorney
were propped up by the union. Whitney Thompson-Tozier states, “The oil
workers gave their strike legitimacy by arguing that their message was rooted in

21
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patriotism and that their goal was to secure American values in the workplace.”23
The strike essentially flipped the rhetoric of the red scare on its head. Instead of
labor being on the defensive against Americanism, strikers argued that oil
producers in the region were attempting to reduce the conditions of “red blooded
American workers” to the level of Russian serfdom and that the producers’
rejection of government intermediation was akin to the hostility of the Kaiser
which they had vehemently fought against in the war.
1.4 Moving Beyond “Us vs. Them”
Two primary questions arise: did the unique conservatism of this strike
and its components benefit or hobble the movement, and how “moral and sober”
was the strike?24

23

Thompson-Tozier, “Armed,” 25.
The term conservatism as a characterization for historical subjects can be problematic. It often
holds a rather nebulous meaning, capable of implying free market ideology one moment then
nationalism the next. The discourse of American conservatism will be fleshed out in chapter 4
and will primarily involve historians’ reactions to it as a social force. The working definition of the
term for the purposes of this project is couched in the language and beliefs of the American
Legion. Coming out of WWI Legionnaires adopted a vision of American nationalism that was
influenced by Progressivism, the Preparedness Movement and wartime service. This nationalism
is what came to be called Americanism as the post-war decade ensued. The Legion’s
interpretation was conservative because essentially it did not believe in drastic political or social
change. This version of conservatism believed that the American political system was inherently
fair and equitable, and that it alone was capable of solving societal problems. So unlike later
formulations of American conservatism in the post-war period that revolved around limited
government and free market ideology, the Legion’s conservatism centered around a severe
loyalty to the federal government. Christopher Nehls argues that this was a “wartime conception
of loyalty,” meaning there was no room for other social identities outside that of an American
citizen, and that the American public was in need of constant policing. Legionnaires sought to
police political behavior by ensuring that various other social identities were discouraged and that
no radical change took place to American institutions. Nehls argues that Legionnaires tended to
“define democracy more as a process rather than a set of civil rights or the free debate of political
ideas.” Therefore Legionnaires such as those that composed the Kern County Oil Workers
Movement, did not see policing people as a violation of American rights, but rather a necessary
measure to ensure the country’s social and political cohesion.

24
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By 1919 American Legion members were articulating that the war had
awoken veterans to a newly forged bond with the American government, one that
led them to feel as though they were an integral part of the government itself, and
no longer careless detached citizens. This newly crafted civic consciousness of
the ex-servicemen was aiming to redefine American national identity.25
Americanism, as it came to be called, was never a precise ideology and more
frequently defined itself in contrast to what it was not. It stemmed from a belief
that American democracy had crafted a “common status and identity for all
citizens based on the equality of opportunity and freedoms they all shared.”26
This implied that Americans had a responsibility to politically behave in such a
way as to protect the institutions that granted those freedoms.
A critical component of this behavior was to reject the impulses of outside
identities. Legionnaires denied the legitimacy of class or ethnic consciousness,
preferring citizens instead think of themselves as “100-percent” Americans with
single, nationally focused civic identities.”27 Kern County oil workers attempted to
balance their class identity with their sense of American nationalism, as if both
were one in the same, that the well-being of American labor was inherent in
American nationalism. They hitched their material class desires to ideological
nationalism and got caught in between its larger transitioning in American
politics.

25
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Under a growing conservative retreat from progressive era policies, the oil
workers' economic conditions grew worse through wage cuts and lack of federal
mediation. They chose to strike, but did so without fully embracing their class
identity. They distanced themselves from radical labor frameworks. They
wavered on the issue of nationalization. They chose not to call for a larger
statewide strike, chose not to strike the refining positions so as not to damage
the “Great Pacific Fleet” and ultimately capitulated to every request from the
Labor Department. Their faith in the federal government was misplaced by 1921,
and effectively hobbled the growth of the movement beyond the local level. They
were a labor movement out of place, relying solely on government action when
the Harding administration’s burgeoning atmosphere was one of “less
government in business.”
1.5 The Operations of Conservatism
Historians concerned with the 1921 strike have noted the workers’
“patriotic unionism,” but often found it a rather scrupulous component of the
movement. The “moral and sober” question is pivotal because it deals with the
fundamental characteristics of American conservatism that were being
formulated at this moment by groups such as the American Legion. This type of
conservatism was designed to underlay American nationalism. It was to be
concerned with citizenry, anti-radicalism, stability of American institutions and
disregard for other forms of social and political identification. Technically it was
also supposed to be about law and order and the pro-Americanization of

10

immigrants. In reality it was always difficult for this brand of Americanism to
uphold these values. These were the values in principle, hardly ever in practise.
Kern County oil strikers did not simply employ the rhetoric of the
American Legion, but also its propensity for violence and racial outlook. The
violence is aptly demonstrated in a number of altercations that strike “law and
order committees” engaged in with potential scabs, bystanders, Wobblies and
“wets,” and their stance on racial integration was staunchly hostile. Oil workers’
willingness to resort to vigilantism in order to police the civic behavior of the
community, as well as their intent to shape the demographics of it, reflect their
embrace of the identity of Americanism.
Upon the strike’s conclusion and despite the fact that their movement’s
conservative design and identity had not led to any form of success, there was
no mass pull to the left on the part of oil workers in the San Joaquin Valley. On
the contrary a portion of workers and supporters of the strike turned to the
nativism of the Klan. The organization saw a swift rise throughout Kern County
in early 1922, and offered another version of Americanism: one that did not even
vaguely believe in integration, had a wider array of scapegoats to choose from
for society’s ills and had no qualms about engaging in lawlessness to enforce its
perceived “moral code.”
1.6 A Conservative Strike
Despite all of this, the oil workers’ movement should still command a
certain degree of respect. The economic conditions they were protesting were
severe; twelve-hour days spent drenched in oil and beaten down upon by an

11

inescapable heat, all set to a hellish backdrop of “barren brown hills and valleys
that exhale the ineffable perfume of sulpherated hydrogen.”28 The oil workers
were reacting against a grim lived reality, in the words of E.P. Thompson, “their
aspirations were valid in terms of their own experience.”29
The strikers may have been acting upon conservative values, but they
were acting none the less, and not as moral patriots or bigoted fanatics, astute
laborers or blind sheep, family men or violent roughnecks, but as American
laborers somehow exhibiting all of this against the backdrop of a strike,
capitalism and a post-war society. The strike was neither moral nor sober,
instead it was invariably tense, underpinned by the Legion’s racialized world view
and penchant for vigilante violence. The strikers’ movement was built upon
unstable ideological ground. Their dire economic situation led them to materially
organize along class lines, in the form of a strike, but their class identity quickly
took a backseat and proved secondary to conservative rhetoric and actions that
placed staunch Americanism first. The oil workers’ movement and its fallout
demonstrates that class formations could be severely complicated by identity as
far back as the 1920s. It also demonstrates that American conservatism as an
animating social force will not always operate according to “slow and steady” or
“idealized” principles; a starker more grim variety can prove quickly adopted and
implemented.

28
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CHAPTER 2
THE BOOM & THE BACKGROUND
Kern County and the larger San Joaquin Valley acquired the discouraging
title of “armpit of California” sometime over the past few decades, and to this day
it can represent a regrettable corridor, one whose arid landscape fills motorists’
minds with images of backwardness.30 However, in the 1910s, Kern County was
an auspicious location for modern development. Wallace Morgan exclaimed in
1914, “There is always some big thing doing in Kern County!” The region’s most
critical resource was its underground sea of oil. Morgan challenged his readers
to “ask the first man you meet in the streets of Bakersfield what gave the town its
great boost forward about the year 1900, and he is very likely to answer it was
the discovery of the oil fields.”31 While it is true that the region was also ripe for
agricultural development, these prospects by the late 19th century were marred
by battles over water rights and a lack of cheap labor. Oil alone was Kern
County’s medium for expressing its modernity.
The 1910s was not so much a moment of oil discovery in the region, but
rather a moment of conjunction between existing oil fields, increased market
opportunities and industrial technologies.32 Oil as a commodity could not simply
be mined out of rock and sold later that day like the precious metals that filled the
surrounding mountains of Kern County. Right up until the late 19th century, oil
being procured in the region was crude and “asphalt-like.” This was until James
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and Jonathan Elwood tapped into an underground sea of oil at the Kern River
Field in 1899, and the resulting boom funneled people into Kern from all over the
country.33
This was followed by the “age of the gushers” commencing in 1910 and
most aptly exemplified by the Lakeview No. 1 well in western Kern County, which
erupted like a volcano that spring and rampaged for eighteen months, ultimately
flooding the surrounding countryside with an estimated nine million barrels of
oil.34 Oil workers were forced to paddle boats across a black sea in attempts to
“sandbag” the ferocious gusher. One after another, wells erupted along the
western hills of Kern County dissolving the imaginary boundary of its
underground ocean of oil once thought to only inhabit the areas along the Kern
River. Wallace concluded that “it fueled the promises of the wildest of wildcat oil
promoters and there was a rush of tenderfeet into the oil game.”35
This growth of Kern County and the booming of the oil fields occurred
despite the fact that the gushers were driving the price of oil down to an almost
flat line. The oil of the region proved too varied in quality, too large in quantity
and too reliant upon infrastructure to make it to market in any immediate manner.
After the initial boom of excitement waned through the 1910s, small scale oil
producers withered under low prices and only the giants such as Union, Standard
and the Associated Oil Company had enough capital to hold out through
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subprime market conditions.36 Quickly these large oil companies and others
formed an oligopoly and bought out remaining large tracts of land alongside the
Southern Pacific Railroad holdings. Kern County’s line between its capitalists
and its laborers grew starker as the region flexed its modernity.
The oil boom drove ensuing advancements in regional agricultural,
permanent city construction, civic standards and modern sensibilities.37 In 1912
Western Kern County hosted the Washington’s Birthday Road Race in which
motorists ripped through the “vulcanized landscape” of the oil fields atop modified
fifty-horsepower engines and visiting spectators commented on the region’s
“spirit of enthusiasm and boost that marks the strides of progress.”38 In 1913 the
newly built C & C Theatre screened Opportunity, a film that depicted a young oil
worker rising through the ranks of industry against the backdrop the westside oil
fields, and Bakersfield residents filled the Popular Pastime Theatre in the Spring
of 1914 to catch a glimpse of The Vitagraph Company’s cinematic production of
Uncle Tom’s Cabin.39
Contests of physical fitness and a growing desire for moments of leisure
permeated the fields of Kern County. In the fall of 1913 Taft hosted a 20-round
heavyweight boxing match between Sam Langford and Jack Lester during which
an accident at the Kern Trading & Oil Company’s No. 21 well caused thousands
of barrels of flaming oil to shoot up into the air.40 Local newspapers devoted

36
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entire sections of their print to covering local baseball leagues, boxing contests
and road racing.41 Oil workers were keen to spend their wages on the latest
spectacle during what little free time they had. Michael McGerr notes that
progressivism applauded a “responsible use of leisure,” and sought a “middle
ground between the idler and the man who works himself to death.”42
Unfortunately oil workers of California obtained less leisure time than
laborers in other industries right through the progressive era. Average
manufacturing wages had increased through the 1910s and the total number of
hours worked had slowly decreased, but conditions in the oil industry had
stagnated. By 1914 the majority of manufacturing workers in California had
earned the eight-hour day.43 Meanwhile oil workers slogged through twelve-hour
days drenched in the product of their labor. Industrial accidents such as Taft oil
worker Ed Ernest catching his hand in a derrick catline that ripped off all his
fingers were an everyday occurrence.44 California oil workers grew increasingly
aware of their economic precarity and exploitation as the 1910s wore on.
2.1 The “Tankies” Strike of 1914
On March 6, 1914, boilermakers of the Standard Oil lease in Wasco went
on strike in response to company attempts at a stretch-out and began their
march to the western oil fields in an attempt to stir up other “tankies” in
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solidarity.45 In the beginning, local reaction to the strike was subdued, distracted
by “General” Charles Kelly’s unemployed army and their march to Washington
with plans to join Jacob Coxey’s movement.46 Kelly’s “army” was primarily
composed of I.W.W. members and was moving east through Sacramento when
they were bogged down in Yolo County by a posse of local deputies and
Southern Pacific goons. Five hours down the California Grapevine Kern County
residents were anxious of such large-scale aggression. One editorial exclaimed
that these “armies” were nothing but “deplorable bums” who should be forced to
work, and that if communities continued to allow such behavior California would
soon face a “vexatious question.”47
Progressive Governor Hiram Johnson refused to aid the “army” in any
way, but was hesitant to call out the state militia and instead believed that local
authorities could handle the situation.48 He was still wrangling with the fallout
from the Wheatland Hop Riot several months before that had resulted in four
deaths and the paranoia that Wobblie sabotage lurked behind every corner.49
The “tankies” strike was successful in reaching Taft and calling out fellow
workers from the fields, however their numbers only ever reached upwards of a
hundred. Solidarity took responsibility for the strike’s organization that spring;
however, local reports indicated that the oil workers shared few affiliations to any
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organization, much less the I.W.W.50 Dubofsky reminds us that the I.W.W. was
always quick to claim credit for a strike and even quicker to stoke suspicions of
how bad things could get.51
By March 27, the strike was still underway and oil workers were picketing
the Standard Oil Camp driving away all potential scabs. Initial reports were
favorable for the strikers, who claimed they were looking to operate peacefully
and without disruption to the local communities of the west side fields.52 Some
local newspapers changed their tune once violence broke out against
strikebreakers in Taft, claiming that “city officials will take means to relieve the
community of the menace of this turbulent army!”53 Somewhere amongst all this
excitement on the westside the 150 “tankies” on strike became an “army,” but
local residents remained rather unalarmed by their activities. A Bakersfield
Californian editorial praised the region’s “red-faced oil men” for their
contributions, charity and “24-karat hearts of gold.”54 It appeared so long as
violence was not rampant, strong civic sentiments connected Kern County and its
oil workers.
On April 7, the month-long strike had ended in rather anticlimactic fashion.
Standard Oil workers would receive no end to the company stretch out and no
increase in wages. Instead they wound up demanding and receiving the
dismissal of the oil camp’s Chinese cooks, their immediate replacement with
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white cooks and a cut in the cost of board.55 Local papers considered the entire
event frivolous claiming that the oil workers might as well have not gone on strike
at all given such meager change in outcome, one that could have been settled a
month ago.56 Standard Oil quickly shook off the temporary lull in production and
soon after published a report on the state of industry in Kern County which
detailed unprecedented figures closing in on 300,000 barrels a day.57 Industry
periodicals exclaimed, “California’s oil fields are a force to be reckoned with!”58
2.2 Oil and the Progressive Era
Due to a plateau in constant capital and oil refining technologies by 1915,
the oil oligopoly that had formed in Kern County was increasingly reliant upon
sheer production to generate profits crippling the major companies’ capacity for
labor concessions.59 Kern County oil workers continually struggled to see a
“square deal,” instead it was more of the same. On April 18, seven oil workers at
the Kern Trading & Oil Company fell thirty five feet through the roof of a
petroleum reservoir before the ensuing timber and heavy equipment came
crashing down upon their bodies leaving nothing but a crude amalgam of “flesh,
wood and steel.”60 Not but three days later Kern County hosted its own
“Homecoming Week,” furnished with the largest parade Bakersfield had ever
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seen, marching bands, motor races and rodeos.61 Local papers boasted of the
county’s “steady development and continued progress” and advertised its
opportunities for the “the home seeker, the capitalist and the wage earner.”62
This type of irony was not lost on Hiram Johnson who on April 25, facing a
crowd in Bakersfield, exclaimed to Kern County business owners, “We say to
you, figure into your business the broken human being, and we will all pay for it,
just exactly as we pay for your broken machinery!”63 However, Johnson
consistently failed to poll well in Kern County. Local editorials claimed the
progressives were responsible for California’s social upheavals of the past two
years and that big money surrounded the Bull Moose.64 In 1914 Kern County
was a democratic stronghold and progressives held little political influence. In
fact it was the only county in the state where Socialists out-registered
Progressives.65 This was all despite the fact that Johnson was the first governor
to introduce an aggressive state regulatory apparatus in the face of capital.66
However, it was an apparatus that was young and had the potential for both
positive and negative impacts on oil workers. By 1914 progressivism’s political
economy appeared more interested in curtailing the “wickedly wasteful methods”
by which oil was produced, and this often meant calls for scientific management

61

“Bakersfield Extends Hearty Greeting to Home Coming Guests,” Bakersfield Morning Echo,
April, 21, 1914.
62
“Welcome To Kern County,” The Bakersfield Californian, April 4, 1914.
63
“Big Crowd Greets Gov. Johnson and John M. Eshleman,” Bakersfield Morning Echo, April, 28,
1914.
64
“Ask The Colonel,” The Bakersfield Californian, April 22, 1914.
65
“Democracy Leads In Kern County By Over 1200,” The Bakersfield Californian, March 30,
1914; 1912 U.S. Census, Kern County, California, U.S. Presidential elections.
66
Quam-Wickham, “Petroleocrats,” 126-127.

20

which “could both defend and attack workers' status in industry.”67 Oil workers
living in company tents surrounded by western Kern County sagebrush were
rightly skeptical and failed to fully embrace government intervention at this
juncture. Hofstder’s image of the progressive “everywhere visibly, palpably,
almost pathetically respectable” was not one likely to be encountered in the
western oil fields.68
California’s “age of gushers” may have coincided with the fervor of the
progressive era, but the state’s oil oligopoly proved too strong and vertically
integrated to be challenged in any meaningful way until 1917 with the onset of a
wartime political economy when oil workers themselves would undergo a shift in
the way they perceived government intervention in industry.69
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CHAPTER 3
“OVER THERE” & “OVER HERE”
Despite the fact that by 1917 Kern County and the rest of America sat at
the edge of two decades rife with social and political upheaval, marked by mass
immigration, unscrupulous concentration of wealth and ubiquitous labor unrest,
Americans were not ignorant of the war in Europe. As Christopher Cappazola
argues, prior to joining the fray, Americans’ “neutrality did not imply apathy.”70
Instead, Americans developed an unprecedented fascination with world maps as
they eagerly traced the events of war and pinpointed places such as Seriavo and
Gallipoli.
Americans at this time, particularly within the western border states, were
also highly aware of actions connected to the Mexican Revolution which they did
not see as separate from the events of the war in Europe.71 Kern County
newspapers touted front page headlines concerning the movements of Carranza,
Huerta and Villa.72 Capozzola rightly contends that historians have not done
enough to incorporate the Mexican Revolution into an American understanding of
WWI, however this transnationalism can be stretched even further to also
integrate Americans’ understanding of radicalism. Through various radical
permutations Mexicans and Americans were in a constant binational flux with
one another, spreading ideas and information, organizing strikes and forays into
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social movements.73 Kern County, a mere 250 miles from the border, was a
geographical node for agricultural and industrial laborers, a region ripe for the
intersection of radicals from both nations. Wobblies even boasted to have
“expropriated” horses from Hearst Ranch to aid Mexican revolutionaries.74
Ultimately Americans, including those of Kern County, felt increasingly connected
to world events and were not taken by surprise when the vacuum-like presence
of WWI began pulling their country into the conflict.
Woodrow Wilson initially urged Americans to be “impartial in thought as
well as in action.”75 A tall order for Wilson himself whose 1916 campaign slogan
read “he kept us out of the war,” but who privately mused that “the German
philosophy was essentially selfish and lacking in spirituality,” and that “England is
fighting our fight.”76 He was not alone through the neutrality period. Americans
as a whole were grappling with the “German mind,” particularly the higher
criticism of German theology that perceived scripture as mere metaphor, which
was hostile and barbaric enough before being amalgamated with German U-boat
activities.77
These activities had briefly subsided after the initial shock of the Lusitania
in 1915, but were resumed by early 1917 when Germany took the gamble to
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mount one final offensive.78 With Russia rumbling in internal revolution and
French morale dwindling, Germany reignited submarine belligerence seeking to
“knock Britain out by starvation before the United States could bring her force to
bear; a gamble that almost succeeded in the summer of 1917.”79
Wilson sat on the eve of approaching Congress for a declaration of war
acutely aware of what it implied. Frank Cobb of the New York World visited him
that night where Wilson argued, “lead this people into war and they’ll forget there
ever was such a thing as tolerance.”80 The atmosphere in America that spring
was increasingly tense. Anti-war sentiments from the socialist and populist wings
withered under shouts of treason. David Kennedy notes, “There seemed indeed
to be something inexorable in the air, some sucking wind from across the
Atlantic, drawing the United States into the vortex of the gruesome conflict.”81
America’s door into a world of fear and hysteria was creaking open.
3.1 Preparedness and Perceived Dissent
First progressivism itself needed to abandon its apprehensions and bend
its principles to accommodate war. Thoughtful men and women had to subvert
the American isolationist claim or the “ancient rule” by arguing that they were not
going to fight Europeans, but rather what Europe meant to the American mind.
The war was recast from calamity to crusade. A crusade against Old World
barbarism, essentially coercive and therefore fundamentally un-American. As

78

Christopher Capozzola, “Uncle Sam Wants You,” interview with Greg Peterson, Robert H.
Jackson Center, February 22, 2018, audio, 13:00.
79
Hofstader, The American Political Tradition, 348.
80
Ibid., 350.
81
David Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004), 23.

24

Kennedy states, “America was going to war against the past.”82 Intellectuals of
the progressive movement like John Dewey argued that Germany must be
crushed so that “social possibilities” can arise and progressive ideals can truly
flourish.83 Americans’ accommodation of war enabled them to extract the
possibilities of pushing liberalism, education and progress to utopian levels.
They began to believe that “war was the forge in whose fires they might shape a
new ethos of social duty and civic responsibility.”84
Of course, right beneath the surface of progressivism’s ideals was a
growing sense of American nationalism and the heightened awareness of
“others” that fell outside its perceived parameters. If the old world was barbaric,
among its worst inhabitants were the savage Huns. Wilson aided in painting this
portrait when in 1915 he warned of disloyalty from the “millions of men and
women of German birth and native sympathy who live among us,” to which the
crowd rumbled in applause.85 Anti-German sentiment rapidly grew ferocious, it
came to sanction state restrictions on teaching the German language, if not
attempts to fully outlaw it, as well as massive restrictions on the German press.86
It initiated dozens of “patriotic organizations” often filled with nativists not only
looking to spread the gospel of 100% Americanism, but dole out vigilante
punishment to “hyphenated” Americans.
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Capozzola argues that Americans in this period walked a fine line between
vigilance and vigilantism.87 On the one hand vigilant American citizens were
organizing themselves into civic groups such as the YMCA and the Salvation
Army, and were acting upon “long standing traditions equating citizenship with
obligation.”88 On the other hand vigilante groups engaged in physical violence
and murder by reorienting “the place of law in the system of political obligation.”89
The growing nationalist sentiment may have stood on a shared ideological
ground of citizenship, civic duty and Americanism, but within those categories
Americans brought their own definitions and prescriptions to bear.
The “war for the American mind” also possessed “top down” components.
In 1917 Wilson appointed former muckraker George Creel to head the
Committee on Public Information which also came to walk a fine line, one
between an appeal to America’s tradition of consensus and crude propaganda.
As America’s involvement in the war increased, so did the institution’s calls for
“accelerated Americanization.” Kennedy notes, “the overbearing concern for
‘correct’ opinion, for expression, for language itself and the creation of an
enormous propaganda apparatus to nurture the desired state of mind and
excoriate all dissenters” was strikingly Orwellian.90
However, 100% Americanism was never solely looking to confront
German people themselves, it was also compelled to eradicate the political
impulses of German thought. An early formation of American national
87
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“character” began formulating itself. Duncan Moench argues that, “it joined
notions of Anglo ethnicity with concepts of liberal political thought and excluded
Americans of German origin and the ‘deviant’ nonliberal thought their
communities were seen as favoring.”91 These “deviant” forms of political thought
were never well articulated. As with much of the Americanism that developed
during this period, it often defined itself by what it was not.92
Writing for the Nation, Fredrick Lewis Allen argued, “The only way to fight
Prussianism is with Prussian tools. The danger is lest we forget the lesson of
Prussianism: that the bad brother of discipline is tyranny.”93 100% Americanism
was a frequently confused ideology, but it approximated danger as being
somewhere in between the German state, barbaric German culture and Germans
themselves.94 One Bakersfield Californian editorial in 1917 read,
Germany is an idea. The modern German has been so insistently and
methodically taught that he is a superman, chosen by God to impose his
will on the heart, he never doubts it. The German Socialist is no
exception. There is only one way to reach the modern German. Beat him
over the head! He understands nothing else. The world must go on
beating him over the head until he says ‘enough’ otherwise the world can
never live with him.95
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Moench points out that the “deviant” political traditions of Germans or
other perceived enemies could be any “socialist, anarchist, or social democratic
political thought outside the Anglo-American liberal norm.”96 The American
Socialist Party had grown at a steady pace through the 1910s and by 1917 it
stood tall as the largest bastion of organized anti-war sentiment in the country.
Prior to the violent reflex action of Wilson’s America, the Socialist Party’s
presence held a comfortable ubiquity. It had gained 6 percent of the presidential
vote in 1912, won hundreds of political appointments across the country and
distributed some of the most commonly read and vibrant press of the era.97 The
Party’s presence in Kern County was just as strong, where socialists out
registered progressives by the thousands, town libraries of the west side were
filled with Socialist literature and mass meetings were held on a monthly basis.98
In early 1917 Samuel Gompers and the AFL struggled to reflect a unified
opinion of the rank and file regarding the war.99 The Socialist Party seemed
poised to gain ground among American workers wary of belligerence. It took a
joint effort between Gompers and the Wilson administration to entice workers
with the opportunities of wartime mobilization and at the same time denounce
opposition to the war.100 The Espionage Act, imposed that June, proved to be an
unscrupulous tool for stamping out American socialist sentiment and other labor
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radicalism such as the I.W.W. It enabled decimation of the radical labor press
and the ability to throw “persons obstructing military operations during wartime”
into twenty-year prison sentences.101 Radical labor organizations in America
were perceived as engaged in both.
Kern County editorials warned of the “misguided efforts” of the People’s
Council of America and other anti-war contingents while boosting that, “the
steady unswerving spirit and clear discerning mind of the American people will be
untroubled by the machinations of the enemy and his allies in the United
states.”102 The preparedness movement sought the formation of a deep social
compact between Americans and the state propped up by “loyalty,” “pep” and
“the spirit of service.” These notions were not only intended to compel
Americans to dutifully accept the war, but also to conceive of their role as
altruistic and oblige them to “serve a sphere wider than their own.”103 One Kern
County editorial exclaimed “idleness ought not be tolerated...men ought to find
some useful occupation now, in time of need, and if they do not then Uncle Sam
should find it for them!”104
Nothing revealed the seismic shifts in American society at this moment
like conscription. It established a deep social contract between soldiers and the
federal government based on accepting the legitimate authority of the state and
its ability to profoundly affect soldiers' lives.105 Kennedy states, “the central
problem of the age was somehow to substitute an ethos of cooperative
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nationalism for the obsolescent credo of narrow self-interest.”106 This passage of
American society from scattered individualism to collective nationalism was best
described by Herbert Croly who saw it as an application of “Hamiltonian means
to Jeffersonian ends.” Americans were increasingly called upon to define
themselves as part of a larger whole through action. Capozzola states, “When
Uncle Sam jabbed his finger at the American public he pointed out their
rights...who was or was not an American...but mostly he pointed at people
because he wanted them to do something.”107 The people of Kern County
proved eager to oblige him.
State newspapers boasted headlines such as “Kern far exceeds draft
quota” and “Kern after draft record!” all commending Kern County’s rather high
enlistment and draft numbers.108 Americans’ sense of duty, sacrifice and
obligation were felt as strongly in Kern County as anywhere else. City and
county authorities rounded up “slackers and evaders” by the truck-load dumping
them out in the desert or throwing them jail for “disloyalty.”109 Capozolla states
that in the mind of the dutiful American, “slackers were not just bad citizens, but
inadequate men.”110 Kern County residents boasted that even if victory of the
war “over there” remains uncertain, the “war at home” against slackers, socialists
and all other varieties of “inadequate men” will be decisively won.111 Everyday
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Americans from the bottom up were converging with the Wilson-Creel
propaganda from the top, meeting in the middle and crafting an atmosphere
where it was “dangerous to be disrespectful.”112
3.2 A New Kind of Capitalism
America’s political economy was rapidly shifting under Wilson who
increasingly believed that American ideals of individualism, opportunity and
competition required the state to act.113 David Montgomery argues, “mobilization
of the economy for war production locked the administrative structures of
business and government tightly together, while full employment augmented
workers’ ability to win strikes and improve their terms of employment.”114 Labor
unions quickly held the upper hand against employers who were forced to
concede to state-coordinated planning and management. A shrill nightmare in
the mind of a Gilded Age capitalist; prices and production levels were set, labor
disputes were mediated through the National War Labor Board and industries
crucial to the war effort were either nationalized or threatened by nationalization.
Labor rank and file had finally gotten a taste of power and were eager to
flex their abilities through the war period. Despite the three-pronged calls from
business, government and the AFL to be patriotic and halt wartime striking, large-
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scale strikes boomed between 1916 and 1918.115 Workers’ material conditions
had improved immensely, but their ideas concerning the workplace had also
begun to flourish as they experimented with increasingly democratic forms of
shop-floor production and sought to challenge the scientific management of the
age.116
3.3 Kern County Oil Workers Unionize
Kern County oil workers began their campaigns for unionization in the
spring of 1917 and a year later were granted union charters, through the AFL, for
locals throughout the Kern County oil fields under the recognition International
Association of Oil Field, Gas Well and Refinery Workers of America.117 However,
unlike the unions in the timber or copper industry that hamstrung wartime
production with massive strikes, the Oil Workers Union was conceived as an
organization that sought only to operate "along the most conservative and best
proven lines of labor unionism."118 It sought the “bread and butter” basics of
shorter days, better wages and improved working conditions.
No matter how conservative and patriotic the Oil Workers Union set out to
be, oil operators took every chance they got to slander, harass or threaten them
after their AFL charter was approved and thousands of Kern County workers had
joined. Oil operators roped popular news outlets such as the Los Angeles Times
into portraying the Oil Workers Union as wrought with Wobbly influence and in
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league with agents of the Kaiser.119 The union struggled to maintain solidarity
under the conservative ideology that sought “industrial peace” and claimed to
have no desire to disadvantage the oil operators. Oil workers still slogged
through the twelve-hour day at low wages, while unions in most other industries
had already won the eight-hour day. A strong contingent of the rank and file
within the Oil Workers Union wanted to strike.
Walter Yarrow joined the Oil Workers Union in 1917 becoming their official
spokesperson and chief strategist. He was a Scottish immigrant and selfproclaimed “oil geologist” who had been living in the Devil’s Den region of Kern
County for several years prior to the war.120 His interest in the Oil Workers Union
appears to have been genuine as he frequently lectured throughout Kern County
on the principles of cooperative social movements. Industry periodicals argued
that Yarrow was the single man responsible for the California oil industry
unionizing movement, highly educated and a “socialist of extremely radical
tendency.”121 However, by 1917 he joined the Oil Workers Union under the
premise that it could achieve its goals through conservative union practises and
that Wilsonian America was all that was needed to better the lives of oil workers.
Yarrow placated rank and file desires to strike in 1917 and incessantly
worked toward federal mediation. He exuded an unshakable faith in the
government stating, “Our men will not quit work and they will bring to justice any
member or nonmember who shall interfere with the greatest oil output in this
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national crisis...we will appeal our cause to those in charge of the nation’s affairs
and this stand of the 10,000 oil workers now members of the union will mark a
new era in industrial movements.”122 By winter the strategy had paid off despite
fierce resistance from oil operators. Federal mediators resorted to threatening
nationalization of the oil industry before operators caved under the premise that it
was a wartime stipulation and the “American thing to do.”123 Kern County oil
workers had finally secured the chance to indulge in the conditions of a wartime
political economy.
3.4 Oil Workers and the Implosion of Progressivism
Kern County oil workers had won and their conservative ideology worked
to craft a political atmosphere in the region that locked together unionism and
strong civic nationalism. Between 1918 and 1921 the union flexed its political
power to great success and elected pro-union officials to the offices of sheriff,
state assembly and district attorney.124 On the state and local level the oil
workers vote grew to be courted due to their strong union solidarity.
Through this period Yarrow was also making the Oil Workers Union
presence felt on the national level. He met with Labor Secretary Daniels in
spring of 1918 and argued, in a rather indirect manner, that the federal
government ought to have faith in the relationship between itself and California
oil workers, and that such workers were up to the task of operating government
leases without the meddling presence of the oil companies.125 Yarrow never
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used the word “nationalization” at this meeting, instead he argued that, “Union
men are immediately available for your service, ready and eager to perform their
patriotic duty.”126 Despite Yarrow’s tenderfeet at this moment, nationalization of
the industry was on the minds of many in Kern County as was the formation of a
labor party. Montgomery reminds us that labor’s demands and ideas grew
exponentially through the war period, but by 1921 had become too intoxicating
for the AFL to recognize and too threatening for business and the state to
indulge.127
The red scare leading up to 1921 provided ample opportunity for American
conservatism, embodied by veterans’ organizations, the federal government and
of course business, to equivocate that the entire labor movement paralleled
Bolshevism.128 This was demonstrated throughout 1919 by an immense wave of
hysteria and violence that swept across the country. What was once a rhetoric of
fear grounded in German aggression was quickly becoming one anchored to the
Bolshevik Revolution. Strikes from Boston to Seattle were portrayed and
handled as acts of political sedition as opposed to ones for economic
demands.129 Race riots broke out from Chicago to Bisbee fueled by fear of
Bolshevik attempts to subsume and weaponize black Americans.130
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Robert Murray argues, “In 1919 America’s soul was in danger...primarily
because it was deserting its most honored principles of freedom.”131 There was
a growing sentiment that the war effort, conjoined with all its anti-liberal
instruments, had drained America of its capacity to act in accordance with
progressive idealism. Murray continues, “it was a spiritual fatigue, involving a
lack of moral stamina, of faith in the principles of democracy, of wisdom and of
effective leadership.”132 Progressivism was imploding by 1919, it had forced
Americans to bend their values in acceptance of a war that had led to military
belligerence, restrictions on free speech, unfathomable death tolls, social
revolutions and famine.133 In 1920, a retrospective George Creel stated, “I am
not sure that if the war had to come, it did not come at the right time for the
preservation and reinterpretation of American ideals.”134 Unions and labor at
large, integral components of Progressivism’s social utopia, were quickly being
hung out to dry.
The election of 1920 ushered in a Republican cohort that had been waiting
in the wings of American politics, strategically watching as Wilsonianism grew
unwieldy. In 1917, Republicans such as Henry Cabot Lodge were able to
posture with an aggressive attitude towards scattered Democrats and pacifist
progressive Republicans, all while supporting Americanism and the war effort.
The war itself had become a political opportunity. Kennedy states, “Lodge lost
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no chance to use war issues both to discipline his own party and to needle the
democrats.”135 The Republican position was designed to have a “clean record of
anti-hun imperialistic patriotism” coupled with criticism of Wilson’s autocratic and
overreaching state.136 Republicans were no fans of radicalism, as Coolidge
demonstrated in Boston, but their position favored the idea of preserving
American liberties from a bloated and belligerent federal government.
Harding’s vague “return to normalcy” campaign offered more critiques of
progressivism than ideas for a future America. However, the underlying tectonic
shift was clearly one that pointed backwards. A plunge back into scattered
individualism increasingly supplemented by the comforts and spectacles of a
modern era.137 Walter Lippmann articulated that American society had turned
out not to be composed of rational actors like the ideals of progressivism had
suggested, but rather a society of simpletons “whose lives are a morass of
entanglements and whose vitality is exhausted.”138 The vibrancy of democracy
contained within the ethos of the progressive era had increasingly become an
obscure memory, and strides made by the American working class were soon to
be backpedaled into a state of amnesia. When Harding exclaimed, “The group
must not endanger the individual,” he not only had the government in mind, but
organized labor.139
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1920s America has long been shrouded in images of glitz, ranging from
jazz and flapper girls to automobiles and athletic superstars. Popular historical
programs play no small part in generating the consensus that the decade was
either “roaring,” “booming” or “burgeoning.”140 However, for American workers
the glitz was firmly underlaid by economic precarity. Mass migration from rural
communities to urban centers created a seemingly abundant labor pool for
employers to pick from and put constant downward pressure on wages.
Immigration restriction after 1924 meant less upward mobility for American
workers, and mechanization on the shop floor was pursued with unprecedented
vigor. What Irving Bernstein called “the march of the machines” implied that
labor in the 1920s had become highly vulnerable to seasonal work, lay-offs and
displacement.141 These conditions were all prefigured by the post-war slump and
vigorous open-shop movement that marked the decade’s inception.
The post-war economic slump did not rock the oil industry as violently as it
did other sectors, however its presence was still felt. The California State Mining
Bureau noted that production by 1921 was at an unprecedented high, but
consumption was dragging behind under post-war conditions. Millions of barrels
were going unused sitting in storage containers due to “overproduction, general
industrial depression and sympathetic adjustment to slumps in eastern oil
fields.”142 However, these conditions in the industry should not be confused for
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causality. Oil operators in the San Joaquin Valley were eager to pursue a return
to pre-war labor conditions regardless of the market atmosphere.
Oil operators were among the first giants of industry to extract themselves
from the political economic relationship of wartime America. In September 1921
they announced a $1-a-day wage cut across the board and threatened a return
to the twelve-hour day.143 Oil operators declared that federal mediation had been
a grave blunder, and that such conditions would not be allowed to persist in
peacetime. They claimed that actions taken by the federal government had been
fundamentally hostile to the notion of economic liberty, and furthermore had
made oil workers apathetic, knowing the government would secure their
employment no matter what.144
The Oil Workers Union deliberated the first two weeks of September
before voting to strike on September 12. The volcano, rife with workers
resentment and angst, had finally erupted. While local newspapers cried, “Oil
Industry Paralyzed!” union officials stressed the critical nature of labor relations in
the oil fields, and argued that “oil workers have gone on strike because they
could see no other course to take.”145 With wage cuts, threats to return the
twelve-hour day, blatant disregard for federal mediation and the discharge of any
worker involved in union activity, it was as if the oil operators had taken upon
themselves a crusade, the objective of which was clearly to decimate the
industrial power labor had struggled to gain.
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CHAPTER 4
HISTORIOGRAPHY IN THE OIL FIELDS
In a way, the first work to examine conditions in the California oil fields
was Upton Sinclair’s 1927 Oil! He painted lush descriptions of spewing oil rigs
from which streams would, “hit the ground, bounce up, and explode...and every
jet that struck the ground turned into a volcano, and rose again, higher than
before; the whole mass, boiling and bursting, became a river of fire, a lava flood
that went streaming down the valley.”146 Sinclair wore his sympathies on his
sleeve, and saw the relationship between oil workers and operators as one
defined by stark class conflict. Oil operators’ “frail human nature was subjected
to a strain greater than it was made for; the fires of greed had been lighted in
their hearts, and fanned to a white heat that melted every principle and every
law.”147 Despite Sinclair’s work, labor relations in the California oil fields
remained a relatively neglected field for historians right through the 20th century.
Gerald Nash, Herbert Gutman and Patricia Limerick all recognized that
labor relations in the oil industry had largely been neglected right through the
1980s despite the work of “new labor historians.”148 Case studies of textile mills,
steel factories and coal mines were favored over the oil fields of California.149
Popular historical programs have overwhelmingly focused on Standard Oil and
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the Rockefellers, shrouding our understanding of the industry in hazy images of
crude oil rigs stacked upon each other and scattered throughout Appalachia.150
Harvey O'Connor, the radical journalist who had covered the Seattle
General Strike of 1919, also looked at the 1921 California Oil Workers’ Strike.
He took note of the strike’s resourcefulness and solidarity throughout Kern,
Fresno and Santa Barbara counties.151 O’Connor primarily argues that the strike
was an inevitable loss “against the stone wall of Standard Oil and the other
majors,” and that the valorous effort was out of touch with the new atmosphere of
Harding’s America.152 However, he says nothing of the strike’s conservative
design, and instead contends that the oil workers nakedly embraced union loyalty
above all else.153
Nancy Quam-Wickham was the first to describe the conservative culture
of the oil workers and indicate that they were attempting to articulate a political
economic identity that reached beyond the crude racism of Asian exclusion.154
Make no mistake, the oil workers never lost that aspect of their identity; they
merely tried to supplement it with a hybrid of American nationalism and labor
unionism. Quam-Wickham ultimately argues that the Oil Workers Strike was
“ephemeral,” cut off from the powerful nodes of labor activism in Los Angeles and
therefore drained of resources.155 However, she is also the only one in the

150

“The Rockefellers,” American Experience, PBS, October 16, 2000.
O'Connor, History of Oil Workers, 25-26.
152
Ibid., 25.
153
Ibid.
154
Quam-Wickham, “Petroleocrats,” 220.
155
Ibid., 244.
151

41

historiography to subtly suggest that the oil worker’s conservatism hobbled the
strike’s alternatives.156
Whitney Thompson-Tozier contrarily argued in her 2013 thesis that the
strike was in fact amply supplied with resources coming from oil workers in
solidarity and merchants in both Kern and Santa Barbara counties.157 She
argues that if it were not for these resources, local support and the patriotic
unionism that oil workers espoused the 1921 strike would have ended much
sooner.158 For Thompson-Tozier the striker’s identity did nothing but grant them
opportunities and support, it truly was the “most moral and sober strike ever
pulled.”159
No historian that has looked at this strike has neglected the political
atmosphere in which the strikers found themselves. Harding’s “return to
normalcy” was clearly a euphemism for returning labor back to a Gilded Age
state of frailty. Particularly in the wake of the West Virginia Coal Wars, it is easy
to dismiss the California Oil Workers’ Strike of 1921 as merely another labor
defeat in a long line of suppression. However, this thinking tells us nothing about
the ways in which a strike can be designed and much less about the ways in
which labor intersects with the broader discourse of identity. The old “us” vs.
“them” in labor history is precisely what is out of date in a modern age where
organized labor is just as weak as it was in the 1920s (if not weaker) and workers
tenaciously cling to various identities outside of class. The 1921 California Oil
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Workers’ Strike is much more than a heroic class struggle between good and
evil, us and them; it is about workers attempting to balance class and national
identities amidst conflict, the implications behind both and the ideological crisis
that can ensue when material conditions deteriorate beyond recognition.
4.1 The Conservative Design
Kern County oil workers built their movement upon conservative values
from the onset. Ex-servicemen oil workers filled the ranks of “Law and Order
Committees,” that claimed not to be picketing but rather keeping the peace and
protecting private property.160 On the local level committees worked quickly to
dispel any connection between a labor strike and anarchy. They maneuvered in
unison with local law enforcement, “closed all illicit refreshment establishments
and other questionable amusement resorts operating in the fields” and moved to
“keep physical violence and loud talk off the streets.”161 Early on the movement
sought to embed their cause within the daily and moral operations of the region.
The vast popular perception of oil workers depicted them as loners and
violent roughnecks, later extensions of the frontier myth and the cowboy ethos.162
However, this was hardly the case in Kern County, where over 80% of residents
including oil workers lived with their families.163 Two days into the strike,
thousands of oil workers and their families paraded down the streets of Taft,
furnished with American flags, union badges and a strong sense of their
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movement’s righteousness.164 The early days of the strike were imbued with a
pervasive festival atmosphere, as union leadership diligently worked to craft its
political face.
Demonstrating that the strike was composed of families lent the
movement a large degree of local support. Certain businesses donated funds to
the Oil Workers Relief Fund and others lowered prices in solidarity. Local papers
claimed the early days of the strike found merchants with “business as usual.”165
Women’s roles in the strike are nearly impossible to ignore. They
boycotted unsupportive merchants, reinforced picket lines, established child care
services, catered massive union meetings, distributed strike information and
visited the homes of potential scabs in attempts to dissuade them.166 Women
were also formed into auxiliary units of the “Law and Order Committees,”
patrolling oil fields and engaging in road blocks. Local papers published the first
pictures of the strike on September 23, and featured a picture of three women on
patrol, dressed in uniform and adorning their union badges, as the caption read,
“Who wouldn’t stop?”167
By this time oil operators had consolidated themselves within the
California Oil Producers’ Association and were vigorously opposed to the strike
and all its demands, which by this point had been whittled down to government
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mediation. Union officials stated, “We have accepted a dollar a day reduction.
We have accepted the open shop. All we ask is that oil operators sign an
agreement with the federal government.”168 Strikers saw the rejection of this last
demand as a “violation of patriotism,” and they were willing to stake their
movement on it. The strike’s conservative design was embodied by
demographics, insistence on “law and order” and strong linkages to the local
community, but perhaps most strongly by the rhetoric the oil workers chose to
wrap themselves in.
The overwhelming majority of oil workers that were funneled into the “Law
and Order Committees” were also members of the American Legion. Vice
President of the Oil Workers Union, R.H. Fraser, boasted “there never was a
more peaceful strike conducted anywhere,” and praised the Legionnaire's
conduct.169 The presence of thousands of American Legion members allowed
the union to tap into and legitimize the language of Americanism. They
successfully depicted the oil operators as undemocratic and “defiant of law and
order government,” and reignited the old Wilsonian dialogue of loyalty.170
Strikers saw the rejection of federal mediation as a disloyal act of aggression on
the part of oil operators, who they blatantly called “the real conspirators against
the American Government.”171
The union sent telegram after telegram to Secretary of Labor James Davis
exclaiming that, “An un-American condition exists in the California oil fields, part
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of the USA, because we citizens of America dare to request that the signature of
our government be placed on an agreement.”172 More dramatically, Legionnaires
also began paralleling their current conditions to what they saw during wartime.
One telegram to the Labor Department declared, “We feel as though under the
yoke of a thousand czars!”173 Their conception of European evil, one that
reinforced their patriotism and shaped their language throughout the strike was
always somewhat vague. To them the Oil Producers Association represented
some amalgam of the Kaiser and Prussianism as well as the Russian Czar and
serfdom.
The rhetoric was effective, it gave the oil workers’ movement the moral
high ground and baffled the oil operators who struggled to hurl similar
accusations back at the strikers.174 As the rhetoric of the Legion increasingly
dominated the strike, the language of class began to fall by the wayside. In
another telegram to the Labor Department on October 5 oil workers argued,
Allow us the privilege of presenting the case of the workmen in the oil
industry not as employee to employer, but as one good citizen to another.
For we are Americans. Not men unable to speak the language of the
county, not men fooled into the folly of sovietism, bolshevism, I.W.W.ism,
or some other ism by foreign agitators from some crowded corner of
Europe. With few exceptions we are the men whose fathers...made
America.175
The conservative design of the oil workers’ strike was deeply rooted in the
Americanism of the Wilsonian period. Kern County oil workers were proud that
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they did not strike during the war as many other unions had and saw themselves
as defenders of American institutions and ideals.176 They claimed, “Because of
our service we have an abiding faith in the power and strength of our government
in its ability to deal impartially and justly.”177 By October it became clear that the
oil workers' movement was fully hitching its identity to the conservative dialogue
of Americanism and civic engagement.

They had moved away from the

language of class conflict and instead they had embraced a dialogue that sought
to place operators, producers and community members on the same playing
field, where class distinctions and identity evaporated in the face of American
civic identity and appropriate behavior.
4.2 Historiography on the Legion
Historical research into the American Legion was rather slim right into the
1990s and often held a congratulatory tone.178 It lacked any critical analysis of
how the Legion attempted to craft a sense of American nationalism beginning in
the 1920s. In this vein, Christopher Nehls’s more recent work on the Legion is
exceptionally revealing. He contends that studying the American Legion is a way
of injecting “social and cultural components into the broader intellectual search
for the political and civic meaning of American national identity.”179
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intellectual endeavor can frequently feel precarious, however, neglecting it
entirely closes us off from potential tools that could help elucidate the broader
ways in which labor and identity intersect.
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In the 1950s and 1960s there were “consensus” attempts at intellectual
history that sought to explain why America’s national identity looked the way it
did.

Perhaps the most famous was Louis Hartz and his work The Liberal

Tradition in America. He argued that Americans were inherently “Lockean” or
“born equal,” that they did not have a feudal past, with all its notions of
hierarchical power, and therefore democratic capitalism was more or less a
foregone conclusion.180 Americans were simply built for it.
Richard Hofstader had similarly argued years prior that Americans
seemed eerily content with their “rudderless and demoralized state of
liberalism.”181

One that included an unfortunate tradition of private property

defense, economic individualism and competition.

He argued that even our

frequent and blaring pronouncements for democracy had usually been for a
“democracy in cupidity rather than a democracy of fraternity.”182 Hofstadter and
Hartz were both labeled “consensus” historians despite the fact that they were
both disgruntled by what that consensus was; that Americans were a group of
people complacently looking backwards and rejecting social change.
Critiques of the American nationalist discourse pivoted by the 1990s to
reflect a more “bottom up” approach, and looked to account for how the factors of
race, gender and ethnicity shaped American nationalism.183 Nehls argues that
the American Legion engaged the discourse on a civic level, and developed
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programs such as “youth sports, Get-Out-the-Vote drives and Boys and Girls
State, all concentrated on teaching Americans to respect the process of
American democracy as a way to ensure the survival of the nation’s exceptional
and defining institutions.”184 Of course, the Legion also preached and heavily
enforced the anti-radicalism of the Wilsonian era. The American Legion may not
have always known exactly what it was, but it certainly knew what it was not, and
that was radical.
The Legion’s conservatism is critical to understanding its relationship with
labor. Nehls argues that it
sprung from the narrowly-defined set of civic behaviors it expected from all
citizens. It demanded that citizens behave with disinterest in civic and
political life, acting for what was in the best interest of the nation first
rather than of particular class, ethnic, or racial affiliations. In fact,
Legionnaires denied the legitimacy of class or ethnic consciousness,
preferring citizens instead think of themselves as “100-percent” Americans
with single, nationally focused civic identities.185
Furthermore, Nehls argues that this conservative “colorblind” and “classless”
notion of citizenship is one that predates Cold War interpretations and ripples
right through the 21st century.186
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The American nationalism espoused by the Legion was an
overwhelmingly conservative force. Nehls places his analysis of the American
Legion alongside other scholarship of the 1990s and 2000s that seeks to
understand American conservatism as more than a panic-stricken state of
mind.187 Instead this scholarship sought to take conservatism quite seriously.
Alan Brinkley saw that global cosmopolitanism of the late 20th century not only
failed to eliminate, but “in many ways increased, the cultural chasms separating
different groups of Americans from each other.”188 This interpretation implied
that conservative Americans had to be accepted as “rational, stable and
intelligent people” who simply rejected the ideas and values of global secular
liberalism.189
Nehls’s work on the American Legion fits snugly into this perspective. He
argues that Legionnaires’ conservatism may have led them to violent extremes
when it came to policing labor radicalism, but they did not do this out of fear of
losing social status.190 Instead, the American Legion’s “reaction to radicalism
and immigration in the interwar period related directly to its concern about the
decline of American democratic exceptionalism, not of themselves.”191 Nehls
recognizes the Legion’s racial and violent tendencies, however he maintains that
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these were not displays of a “nativist streak,” but rather genuine expressions of
national identity.192
Thompson-Tozier places the behavior of Legionnaires in Kern County
alongside this sentiment. She argues that, “This strike, made up in a large part
by WWI veterans was a continuation of their fight for the American dream.”193 In
her analysis the Americanism invoked by strikers holds a rather virtuous position.
The problem with this is that it obfuscates the drop off between what the strikers’
rhetoric was and how their principles held up on the ground. Most recently
historians have begun grappling with the possibility that conservative social
forces, such as the Americanism displayed by Kern County strikers, should not
be left unchallenged as merely “genuine expressions” in need of an empathetic
lens.
4.3 The Pivoting Nature of American Conservatism
The modern discourse on American nationalism and conservatism has
once again thrown historians into a state of bewilderment. At a recent meeting
facilitated by the American Historical Association, historians eagerly convened to
discuss what the 2016 election of Donald Trump meant with regards to our
understanding of American conservatism. There was a shared sense of disarray.
Twenty years ago historians had figured out how to talk about conservatism as a
“politically robust and complicated phenomenon” that moved through American
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history with a “slow and steady hand,” similar to the wandering drawl of William
Buckley.194
In attendance was Seth Cotlar, history professor at Willamette University,
who stated, “The last 200-plus years of American history have been like a series
of West Wing episodes and then [last] November, someone sat on the remote
and now we’re watching a marathon of Curb Your Enthusiasm.”195 Questions
floated around the meeting such as, how can one “understand empathically” an
American conservatism that blatantly crosses the line into white nationalism?
The old notion of “colorblind conservatism” seemed violently drawn into question.
Another professor, Joshua Lynn, argued that our previous understanding
of American conservatism was perhaps never as solid as we thought it was. He
stated, “The definition of conservatism and the designation of who is
conservative have always been contested...Adding the debate over Trump’s
conservatism to the mix does not destabilize American conservatism as a
historical category. Because it has never been a stable category.”196 If the
meeting generated a consensus at all, it was that many traditional definitions of
conservatism have officially proven themselves inept.
Rick Perlstein observed that, “If Hofstadter was overly dismissive of how
conservatives understood themselves, the new breed of historians at times
proved too credulous.”197 Whether or not all of the old characterizations of
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American conservatism must be thrown out is still unsettled. Kim Phillips-Fein
argued in 2011 that, “Historians who write about the right should find ways to do
so with a sense of the dignity of their subjects, but they should not hesitate to
keep an eye out for the bizarre, the unusual, or the unsettling.”198 What has
become clear is that the old descriptions of American conservatism, if not thrown
out, must be heavily supplemented by factors such as a propensity for violence,
superstition and racism.199
4.4 Where the Strike Stands
In 1921 the oil workers of the San Joaquin Valley demonstrated a few
things. First that the discourse of “us vs. them” in labor disputes could be
severely complicated by workers’ identities.200 The oil workers’ movement grew
from a conservative mindset, one fostered by the Wilsonian era, anti-radicalism
and the Americanism of the Legion. Through action and rhetoric they hitched
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their material class desires to ideological nationalism and got caught in between
its larger transitioning in American politics. Oil workers chose to strike, but did so
without fully embracing their class identity, and this proved detrimental to the
growth of their movement.201 Secondly, once their movement became fused with
the identity of Americanism, it proved difficult for oil workers to maintain the
“idealism” that identity called for. The movement that was supposed to be “moral
and sober” frequently proved to be the opposite, and upon the strike’s conclusion
many disillusioned oil workers and supporters that had once embraced the
Legion’s Americanism fell into the nativism of the Klan. To study the California
Oil Strike of 1921 is to explore the unusual. The case complicates our
understanding of when and how labor intersects with identity, and it also provides
an opportunity to reassess our conception of how American conservatism has
historically operated.
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CHAPTER 5
LIMITS TO GROWTH & CONSERVATIVE OPERATIONS
Officially the American Legion post in Kern County never actually
endorsed the 1921 strike. John R. Quinn, commander of the California
department of the Legion, publicly announced, “The American Legion is strictly
neutral in all labor controversies,” and that men on either side of the conflict were
acting “as individuals and not members of this organization.”202 However, on the
ground relations were much more homogenous. Legionnaires looked out for one
another with a strict sense of patriotism, and Legion halls were “thrown open to
members of the strike’s law and order committees,” where cots, coffee and
sandwiches were served up.203
Legionnaires in Kern county were always quick to identify as American
citizens before union men, and the Oil Workers Union and local labor press
always sought to court them, not the other way around. Even prior to the strike
the Union Labor Journal of Bakersfield wrote, “Labor men will be making a great
mistake if they fail to take their proper places in the American Legion. The
mistake will be more disastrous to themselves than to any one else. If labor men
would have the American Legion reflect in any degree the ideals of labor they
must see to it that labor’s opinion is represented in the Legion.”204 The early
relationship between labor and the Legion was not as bitterly antagonistic as it
would later be, but it was far from warm. By 1920 large unions such as the
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United Mine Workers were already distancing themselves from the Legion,
ordering rank and file to resign from the organization and beware of Legion strike
breaking.205
The conservative Oil Workers Union attempted to placate the Legion and
ignore the notion that union men and Legionnaires were fundamentally different.
The Kern County Labor Council claimed, “the interests of the great majority of the
members of the American Legion are known to be identical with the aims and
aspirations of organized labor.”206 When the union voted to strike it was
understood that the nature of the strike would heavily reflect the character of the
thousands of Legionnaires present in the oil fields. Local papers exclaimed,
“Bakersfield labor backs American Legion!”207 If the relationship did not look
hostile, it certainly looked lopsided.
The Legion’s sense of nationalism was dominant and unwavering. Walter
Yarrow’s first telegram to the Labor Department resisted calling out the
government, and instead merely alluded to a “lack of decisiveness.”208 The union
failed to extend the strike to thousands of oil men working in refinery and pipeline
positions due to “patriotic motives.”209 Strikers wished no harm to befall the
“Great Pacific Fleet,” and “wanted to give the government the opportunity to
show it is interested in some phases of our economic welfare.”210 The movement
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consolidated its patriotic image, and clearly articulated that its desires laid in the
hands of the federal government.
Newspapers set the stage for grim class warfare, despite the fact that
none would be found. The Riverside Daily Press exclaimed, “War Looms Up in
Kern as Hundreds of Strikers in Oil Fields Act as Self Constituted Police.”211
Another cried, “Civil War Threatens State as Labor Army Closes its Highways!”212
Others warned of “another West Virginia” if immediate actions were not taken to
resolve the labor dispute.213 However, unlike in Mingo County West Virginia,
where Legionnaires proudly guarded the Dh-4B planes that bombed striking coal
miners and where they joined other “better people” in patriotic chants for law and
order, the Legionnaires in Kern County claimed they were the “law and order,”
distanced themselves from the language of class and placed faith in the
government above faith in their union.214
The oil workers movement also detached itself from any sort of radical
labor element. I.W.W. organizers were on the scene consulting with union
leadership the day the strike broke out.215 However, their presence increasingly
dwindled as the strike progressed and their relationship with Legionnaires grew
tense. Oil workers began kicking Wobblies out of the strike zone only four days
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after its inception, making it clear they had no interest in allowing any radical
features to influence the design of their movement.216
Oil workers fervently preferred their “badges of red, white and blue,” to the
“red cards” of the I.W.W. Wobblie organizers struggled to grasp what they saw
as the movement’s bullheadedness and blatant disregard for rigorous class
consciousness. George P. West covered the strike for The Nation and noted, “A
handful of stormy petrels of the I.W.W. who rode the rods into Bakersfield were
arrested, disarmed and taken before the strikers central committee questioned
and deported. The union officers quoted them as saying, “Yes we're I.W.W.’s,
the tough kind at that, and we can accomplish more in ten minutes here with a
match than you can in ten years with your tactics.”217 The deportations of
I.W.W.’s from Kern County became a prominent and consistent feature of the
strike.
Vice President of the Oil Workers Union, Harry Baker, was particularly
compelled to maintain the strike’s utmost conservative image. He frequently and
publicly rattled off the numbers of Wobblies kicked out of the strike zone and
rebuked their strike tactics and calls for “crippling industry.”218 Baker was a
staunch supporter of the “American Plan” or open shop platform. In a confusing
interview with local newspapers, he rambled on about how union men “laboring
under the open shop plan are members because they highly estimate the value
of unionized organization,” and that those in favor of the closed shop were not
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“strongly imbued with the union idea.”219 Far from being a Wobblie strategy,
even talk of the closed shop was off the table, as the Oil Workers Union further
honed their conservatism.
Another way in which the strike’s conservative design hobbled its ability to
grow beyond the local level was its refusal to call a statewide strike. Early on
Yarrow threatened, “if the operators continue their attempts to bring in strike
breakers and gunmen we will be forced to call out the rest of the workers in the
state.”220 Union leadership knew exactly what this action would imply. Claiming,
“If we call a statewide strike, tying up all oil fields, pipelines and refineries, the
federal government undoubtedly will take action in one manner or another.”221
Their goal was to provoke positive federal action on their behalf without
appearing too aggressive. This proved to be a tall order for a movement based
around conservative unionism.
Despite this, statewide support for the general strike was strong.222
Workers in the oil fields of Contra Costa, Whittier, Ventura, Santa Paula and
Fullerton sat on the edge of the union decision fully prepared to join Kern County
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workers in solidarity.223 Oil unions of the Los Angeles region had been financially
donating to the San Joaquin Valley strike since its inception.224 Oil workers and
merchants in Santa Maria were, “practically 100 per cent in support of the strikers
of the valley.”225 The general strike loomed large in the minds of both workers
and operators. The Kern County movement was poised to over double in size
and incorporate a much broader scope of union ideas.
Once again however the conservative principles of the Oil Workers Union
in Kern County proved too strong. The potential growth of a broad-based
unionism fell second to the notion of unionism centered around absolute faith in
the government and the identity of Americanism. Union leadership met on
September 23 and voted not to call a statewide strike. Yarrow left the meeting
declaring, "I will recommend to the district council that they defer calling the
general strike in compliance with the request of the government, as it is our
constant desire to recognize the United States authorities in all dealings in this
matter. We are prepared to fight this battle to the last trench and we believe that
we have the government on our side in this controversy.”226 It was the last time a
general strike would be proposed and from this moment on the Kern County
strike grew increasingly insular, its workers patriotically clinging to their identities
and a staunch belief in their government.
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The closest Kern County oil workers came to approaching radicalism was
on the issue of nationalization, but even here their conservatism caused them to
waver and never fully articulate rank and file desires. Several oil fields in western
Kern County had been government leases since the war, but were now operated
by the region’s large oil companies. Once the strike shut down production on
these leases, rumors circulated the fields that the government was going to
swoop in and take control of daily operations.227 Oil workers were ecstatic,
exclaiming, “We would be glad to work for the government!”228 This was a
stance that Legionnaires engaged in the strike could easily find agreeable. For
these strikers there was little distinction between working an oil lease for the
federal government and serving in the U.S. military.229
Operators immediately jumped on the issue to remind everyone involved
in the oil workers movement that this was the era “less government in business,”
and that there was nothing patriotic about peace time nationalization of
industry.230 Al Weil, attorney to the Oil Producers Association, declared that
government intervention in the oil industry had led to a “slackness,” and made
workers lazy and ignorant of how American capitalism worked.231 M.H. Whittier,
president of the Association, cried, “striking oil workers in Fresno and Kern
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County have transformed this district into a little Russia!”232 Oil operators were
able to keep their attacks cloaked in the vague language of the red scare, while
at the same time not appearing grossly anti-American themselves.
What made it worse for oil workers was that they were never able to
articulate that nationalization of industry was what they wanted. Early on R.H.
Frazer argued that, “on the question of nationalization the oil workers have not
made this an issue,” only to vaguely add that, “they believe that in the not far
distant future petroleum and other natural resources will be operated...for the
benefit of the entire citizenship of the nation.”233 Weeks into the strike Yarrow
reiterated that, “workers have no desire to nationalize the industry.”234 However,
when Legionnaires spoke on the issue themselves they failed to argue it was
necessary, but also failed to dispel it out right. In a telegram to the Labor
Department Legionnaires in the oil fields argued, “we believe that bringing
government ownership to industry will necessitate a change in the attitude of the
people of the nation toward that issue. If these things are done it will be long
after the oil wells in California now producing, cease to produce.”235 The oil
workers continued to appear confused about how much to demand from their
situation.
The identity of Americanism that workers rooted themselves in did not
allow for “ideal” citizens to make political economic demands on their
government. Instead Legionnaires like those that filled the ranks of the oil
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workers movement, “denied the legitimacy of race, ethnicity, and particularly
class as the primary reference point for one’s political obligation.”236 To them if
nationalization of industry was going to come about at all, it was going to come
about through a consensus reached after the cultivation of American nationalism.
This inherently vague articulation was demonstrated throughout the strike, and it
offered little internal understanding of the issue within the movement, much less
outside the Kern County region.
The Kern County oil workers had obliged the federal government in every
manner possible right up to the end of the strike on November 2, the moment
they abandoned their movement proved no different. One week prior President
Harding had delivered perhaps the most talked about speech of his
presidency.237 He rambled about “the color line” in America, rivetingly calling for
“political equality” between blacks and whites, while at the same time arguing
that both were fundamentally different and would never amalgamate.238 The
audience sat particularly flummoxed.
However, Harding did end the speech on familiar refrain, one that the
Republican regime of the 1920s was in absolute agreement on; that civil
disobedience of any kind would not be tolerated. Newspapers of the Kern
County region heard this above all else. Harding exclaimed, “We are unshaken
by the world cataclysm, we hold our foundations to be eternally right...The nation
will tolerate the threat of no minority which challenges the supremacy of the law
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or endangers our common welfare.”239 The oil workers of Kern County had
crafted a movement based on conservatism and the identity of Americanism, and
by late October 1921 still clung to the belief that they were acting in accordance
with national civic values and that the federal government would vindicate them.
Surely the president was not talking about them.
The Oil Workers Union had been anxiously awaiting a response from the
Labor Department for months, and on October 30 they got one. Secretary of
Labor James Davis telegraphed the union requesting an end to the strike for “the
resumption of production in this great basic industry which is so vital to the
nation.”240 Members of the union met and concluded that, “in the face of the
government's request they could not do otherwise than vote to return to work.”241
The oil workers movement had come to a rather anticlimactic and ideologically
dazed conclusion.
R.H. Frazer confirmed that they had ended the strike due to the
government’s request, but that the union was still as strong as ever.242 Whitney
Thompson-Tozier argues that, “If the government had not halted the strike, the oil
workers had enough community support, resources, and drive to continue the
strike longer.”243 However, after the decision to end the strike, the ensuing
months saw no revitalization or redesign of the oil workers movement, no rebirth
of unionism and certainly no pull to the left.
239

“Government Will Not Tolerate Defiance of Its Authority,” The Riverside Daily Press, October
26, 1921.
240
“Oil Strike Ends; Men to Go Back to Fields on Thursday,” The Bakersfield Californian,
November 1, 1921.
241
Quam-Wickham, “Petroleocrats,” 248.
242
“Oil Strike Ends,” The Bakersfield Californian, November 1, 1921.
243
Thompson-Tozier, “Armed,” 6-7.

64

Quam-Wickham notes the sense of betrayal that was felt throughout the
oil fields.244 The movement had “pinned its faith to Uncle Sam’s signature” only
to be left out to dry. George West had greatly admired the oil workers
insurgence, but early on questioned their methods, claiming,
If Americanism means anything the oil workers will be vindicated in
everything they have done and will go back to work with renewed
enthusiasm for their constructive work in real economic and political
democracy. If Americanism doesn't mean anything then Yarrow has taken
the most effective means of demonstrating it and 8,000 oil workers and as
many more as can put two and two together will have had a liberal
education in the structure and function and animus of the established
order.245
The conservative design and Americanism of the oil workers movement had
gotten them nowhere in the context of the 1921 strike. These elements had
worked to constrict the movement’s growth, muddle its desires and provide the
workers with no alternative option but to concede and ponder the fallout.
The discourse surrounding American nationalism had officially shifted from
the Wilson variety to that of Harding, where there was no room for strikes
regardless of how patriotic they claimed to be and where business was given free
reign. This was all coupled with a reinstatement of American isolationism.
Harding stated, “I think it's an inspiration to patriotic devotion to safeguard
America first, to stabilize America first, to prosper America first, to think of
America first, to exalt America first, to live for and revere America first.”246 The
language is not far off from that which the Kern County oil workers had attempted
to utilize. David Montgomery once noted, “A movement that agrees to side with
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the patriotic cause of its government, can not only not be attacked but actually
encouraged in its growth…but then the question is can you break with that? Can
you go back out on your own?”247 Despite the fact that the oil workers movement
had clung to American nationalism throughout the 1921 strike, the move never
encouraged its growth, and ultimately demonstrated that it could not break from
that identity and redesign itself along any other lines of labor unionism.
One local editorial prefigured the political economic mood that would
dominate the remainder of the decade stating,
The strike really is an aftermath of the war. The result of government
interference in business. It is another Wilson administration legacy. The
workmen hoped to force the oil companies to make their wage
agreements through the government, as they were persuaded from
Washington to do during the war. The employers refused. Both sides are
beginning to appreciate the wisdom of President Harding's policy, of less
government in business. The road to normalcy is long and rough, but
we’re making progress.248
Kern County oil workers knew that Harding was speaking to them when on
December 6 1921 he exclaimed that, “It is not desirable that labor shall be
permitted to exact unfair terms of employment or subject the public to actual
distresses in order to enforce its terms.”249 The Kern County Oil Strike of 1921
demonstrated to be a stunningly conservative movement, one that often looked
to be more rooted in Americanism than any middle-of-the-road or radical
unionism. What had been the public distresses of the “most moral and sober
strike ever pulled?”
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5.1 How “Moral and Sober” Could it Have Possibly Been?
Recent work on the strike has recognized its unusual patriotic fervor, but
has overwhelmingly perceived it as something rather incorruptible.250 This
glosses over the fact that an entire seismic discourse, concerning what American
nationalism should look like and how it should operate, was being formulated in
this period beginning with the “preparedness movement” and ending in the 1920s
with the “return to normalcy.” The type of nationalism that the American Legion
was helping to create after WWI was based upon an interpretation and protection
of citizenship that was ideologically disconnected from forms of social
identification such as class, race and ethnicity. It insisted that Americans engage
in a “narrowly-defined set of civic behaviors” based in anti-radicalism and
indifference to civic and political life.251
Nehls argues that the American Legion was based upon fundamental
idealism.252 The organization’s members believed that rejecting class, racial and
ethnic identities would create a more homogenous nation, and that suppressing
radicalism would preserve American democratic institutions that allowed for
political and economic equality. The idealism of the Legion demanded that
American citizens adopt a new civic identity, while upholding a commitment to
law and order.
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Nehls’s primary contention is that, “Only by taking the way the Legion
constructed its nationalistic vision seriously and understanding its unique
historical context can the full depth of the Legion’s conservative impact on
American political culture in the 20th century come more clearly into view.”253
This sentiment was the dominant historiographical stance through the 1990s and
2000s. Accusations that American conservatism and its practitioners were
nothing more than crazed, racist and conspiracy-minded were replaced with
empathetic analyses that sought to depict American conservatives as rational
actors.
However, recent historians have found this framework complicated by
forces within the broad sweep of American conservatism that defy fitting neatly
into the characterizations of “rational,” “colorblind” or in the words of Lisa McGirr,
“thoroughly modern.”254 Rick Perlstein recently argued, “Future historians won’t
find all that much of a foundation for Trumpism in the grim essays of William F.
Buckley, the scrupulous constitutionalist principles of Barry Goldwater or the
bright-eyed optimism of Ronald Reagan. They’ll need instead to study
conservative history’s political surrealists and intellectual embarrassments, its
con artists and tribunes of white rage.”255 He concluded with a tepid call to arms,
stating that if historians are going to attempt to craft new histories of American
Conservatism, that “the first step may be to risk being impolite.”256 Perhaps
another way of grappling with the history of American Conservatism, while
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inescapably situated in a modern context, is to recognize that it is broad enough
to encapsulate contradictory ideas, and that above all sometimes the operations
of this social force can simply be strange, crazed or alarming.
The Kern County Oil Workers Movement of 1921 must be placed in this
larger context. Nehls himself contends that the idealism of the American Legion
is impossible to situate disconnected from its racial conceptions, proclivity for
violence and its capacity for irrationality and conspiracy building.257 The
perception that the Kern County strike was entirely “moral and sober” neglects
the fact on the ground the situation was quite tense, that Legionnaire strikers
were blatantly racist and were regularly engaged in violence against members of
the community throughout the strike zone.258
The analysis sits on a knife's edge. One moment the strike fails because
it is too conservative, and the next it defies being characterized as peaceful. The
fine point is that the movement was conservative in terms of its design and
identity; the strikers may not have been “moral and sober,” but that does not
mean that they were not conservative. Typically the relationship between labor
disputes and lawlessness is conjoined by some form of labor radicalism that
either looks to engage in sabotage or violent self-defense, but in Kern County
radicalism was disdained. When oil workers broke down and engaged in
violence it was not for the sake of labor radicalism, crippling of industry,
destruction of private property or dishing blows to outfits of “law and order.”
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When they engaged in violence it was frantic, ideologically scattered and often
aimed at people supposedly breaking with “law and order” and the moral idealism
of the American Legion. Upon the strike’s conclusion oil workers stuck it out in
Kern County under worse conditions or were seen “leaving Kern's westside
fields, carrying nothing but their ‘blanket rolls’ and trekking southward to the oil
fields of the Los Angeles basin.”259 However, another contingent of oil workers
as well as local people that had supported the strike, grew disillusioned by the
demonstration of Americanism the Legion had shown and instead turned to the
newly rising Klan of the San Joaquin Valley.
5.2 The Oil Workers and Race
Nehls has argued that, “the Legion’s approach towards racial difference
was more complicated than simple nativism. Immigrants and other racial
minorities had to fit into the Legion’s broader nationalizing agenda.”260 The
idealism of the Legion had to leave open the possibility that racial or ethnic
identifications could be overcome in order to establish a more perfect American
citizenry. However, this was never a real possibility with the Legion in Kern
County or for the oil workers movement.261 Quam-Wickham notes that early on
one of the principle identities oil workers rallied around prior to unionization in
1917 was Asian exclusion.262 This dimension of the Kern County oil worker
never left.
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In 1920 the population of Kern County was 97% white and 86% native
born.263 This made it the fourth largest county in the state to boast high
demographic marks for Americanism, and the bulk of these pockets ran along the
entirety of the western oil fields.264 Compared to low-paying factory jobs on
either coastline that siphoned off massive working immigrant populations right up
to 1924, work in the oil fields attracted white native-born workers seeking
opportunity to move into the skilled trades. Quam-Wickham and ThompsonTozier note the large degree of improvisation that took place on the job and
allowed for a more fluid degree of upward mobility in the trade.265
Despite Nehls’s contention that, “the Legion remained committed to the
fundamentally Progressive idea that outsiders could become American,” the
moral idealism of Legion rhetoric failed to ever take root in Kern County.266 This
is most aptly demonstrated by the 1921 proposal for a Japanese agriculture
colony. Supporters of the proposal were few, and argued that the Japanese
appeared “highly successful” in the cultivation of grapes, melons and other fruits
throughout the surrounding counties of Fresno and Ventura.267 They even
contended that, “their presence in the community is necessary for adequate
growth and prosperity.”268 However, reactions against the proposal were
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overwhelming and constituted a strong local alliance predicated upon local Anglo
identity.
David Roediger reminds us that workers operating under hegemony are
still historical actors “who make choices and create their own cultural forms.”269
Oil workers of Kern County were not victims of an imposed top down racism, but
rather part of a white coalition between themselves and other community
members. Similar to how oil workers conceived of their strike in terms of
Americanism, so too did they utilize this identity and ideology in their efforts to
preserve the region’s whiteness. Legionnaires considered rejection of the
Japanese as “their duty as loyal Americans.”270
Alexander Saxton argues that, “Once California had filled, pushed and
pulled the cart of Chinese exclusion to its legislative destination, no sleight of
hand was needed to turn attention to the Japanese.”271 Kern County workers
had effectively kept Asians out of oil jobs right from the industry’s inception, and
as the 1914 “tankies” strike reveals, “the pleasures of whiteness could function
as a wage for white workers.”272 The fact that oil workers were still finding time to
vote for immigrant bans and voice racist opinions despite being in the midst of a
massive labor dispute is salient.273 The 1921 proposal for a Japanese agriculture
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colony demonstrates that oil workers and members of the community were
unwilling to abandon their white native-born identity by welcoming in outsiders,
and that their form of conservative unionism was going to run parallel to these
interests.274
A prime example of such a Kern County resident was Thomas W.
McManus, a Legionnaire and Chairman of the National Committee on Oriental
Immigration. McManus lived in the Bakersfield region, worked as a real estate
subdivider and was sympathetic to the oil workers movement; believing that the
identity behind Americanism possessed a strong underlying social glue for Kern
county residents including oil strikers.275 He exclaimed, “It is better for us to
make less money, but to keep our American and white population.”276 He
continued, “Without exception every community in California that has suffered
from the blight of the presence of this unassimilable Asiatic race...let us maintain
the barrier against the influx of Oriental typhoon!” McManus reflected a popular
sentiment in Kern County and the Legion’s ineptitude when it came to engaging
their own ideals surrounding overcoming racial and ethnic identity.
The oil workers movement was in resounding agreement with McManus
and condemned “the importation of Japanese labor...or any other alien
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population.”277 A unanimous county vote shot down the colony proposition and
preserved the region's racial makeup.278 Union members, Legionnaires and
numerous other county officials were all in agreement that, “Kern County was the
only fertile district in California not yet overrun by the orientals” and they intended
to keep it that way.279
Historiographically we must come to terms with the fact that the American
conservatism the Kern County oil workers movement embodied was never one
that engaged in a pro-Americanization agenda. Despite the fact that the
overwhelming majority of strikers were Legionnaires, whose organizational
rhetoric included the ability to recognize “the potential for individuals to transcend
their race and become American in full,” this was never seen in the Kern County
oil fields.280 This was merely one component of their identity, but it should work
to throw into question how empathetic historians of American conservatism can
be when there exists a blatant racial dimension to the nation building agenda of
this time period.281
5.3 A Propensity for Violence
The most “moral and sober strike ever pulled” was frequently violent. The
movement’s “law and order committees” were allegedly designed to enforce
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prohibition and gambling laws, ensure private property was protected and
apprehend both strike breakers and radical agitators. They were composed
almost entirely of Legionnaires due to their military training and exclaimed that
they were “pledged to patriotic maintenance of Law and Order in all oil field
localities.”282 Committee bylaws such as “no heated arguments,” “do not exceed
the speed limit” and “do not carry firearms” were broken on an almost nightly
basis as Legionnaires held conservative American patriotism in one hand and
violent impulses in the other.283
The patriotic rhetoric of the oil workers movement was not far off from
what high ranking Legion officials were calling for, but struggling to maintain.
American Legion National Commander Franklin D’Olier reminded members in
1919 that,
We must always clearly bear in mind that any disposition on the part of
individual members of the Legion or of local posts to take law into their
own hands, to regulate by force or demonstration of forceful intent what is
contrary to our interpretation of one hundred percent Americanism, or to
act as self-constituted vigilance committees in disregard of lawful and
properly constituted authority, is not only subversive of the principles and
ideals of The American Legion but will weaken and tend to destroy our
influence for good in this country.284
Once again the idealism of the Legion was to be challenged. It insisted on lawful
civic participation, and as Nehls has contended it was fully capable of this.
However, Legionnaires including the oil strikers of Kern County also proved that
idealistic conservatism amidst deteriorating economic conditions bred an
atmosphere where violence was increasingly looked to as an answer.
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The roadblock system of the strike zone was as extensive as it was
vigilant. Every highway leading into the westside fields was equipped with a
roadblock and guard outfit from the “law and order committees.” Even on rural
highways such as State Route 58 and 166, motorists traveling into Kern County
were stopped in the dead of night, interrogated and forced to “explain their
presence to the satisfaction of the striker guard.”285 After night fall, on the
highways and in the oil fields, tensions between strikers and whomever they
encountered grew high.
Upon the strike’s inception sheriff D.B. Newell and local constables
worked to deputize strikers throughout Kern County; a testament to the local
political clout of the oil workers union and the advances they had made through
the war period.286 The early success of the strike should not be understated.287
“Law and Order Committees” were particularly adept at intercepting strike
breakers and effectively crafted what oil producers saw as a corrupt fiefdom or
“little Russia.”288
However, the strikers also attempted to heavily control what was said
about their movement in the press. They wrapped their image around the
identity of conservative Americanism and did everything they could to preserve it.
Upon entering the strike zone members of the press would be intercepted and
then brought to the “central strike committee” where they were questioned in
285
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regards to their intentions and credentials.289 It was not uncommon for those that
“failed to win favor with the committee” to be escorted out of the strike zone.290
Activities of the “Law and Order Committees” never completely sat right with local
press and their relationship grew tense over the course of the strike.
Violence was encouraged as the strike wore on and only worked to fuel a
sense of frenzy. Union leadership offered strikers advice for how to handle
potential saboteurs exclaiming, “The best way to answer him is to hit him
between the eyes, quickly, so that lie and the companies for whom he is working
cannot bring discredit upon you and your organization!”291 Strikers hung effigies
from bridges leading into the strike zone all adorned with placards warning
agitators of the consequences for disrupting law and order.292 Despite the rage
oil workers felt towards saboteurs and strike breakers, Quam-Wickham notes
that oil operators halted all attempts to bring in such forces after the September
14 train incident.293 Ensuing violence throughout the strike zone was directed
against those perceived to have violated the movement’s conception of law and
order, one that paralleled the Legion’s moral idealism.
On the evening of September 18 George M. Wilkins, a Kern County real
estate agent, was traveling back from a camping trip in the Yosemite Valley with
289
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his wife and their nine-year-old son when they were stopped by strikers near the
McKittrick oil fields. They had begun to slow down as they approached the
roadblock when shots rang out striking the vehicle. Wilkins drove forward before
being stopped by the gunmen who then proceeded to interrogate the family,
claiming that they were looking for contraband and sought to search the vehicle.
After a heated debate between Wilkins and the leader of the “committee,” Wilkins
began to pull forward and depart the roadblock, as he did a “fusillade” of bullets
came reigning down upon the vehicle narrowly missing his son and wife. They
managed to evade the barrage and continue on into Bakersfield, their car riddled
with bullets.294
Despite similar accounts mounting, Sheriff Newell continued to reiterate
that, “the whole situation is being handled by deputy constables forming the law
and order committees...and that he has no control over the constables or their
deputies.”295 Kern County residents unaffiliated with the strike did not hesitate to
leave town while the time was ripe. Local reports indicated massive “outbound
traffic from the strike districts” with automobiles “carrying large amounts of
baggage” as well as “family chickens and pets.”296 Harry J. Baker, director of the
strike in the Kern River district, attempted to console residents of the oil
communities stating that violence “was not sanctioned by the organization and
instead was the work of a few impulsive men.”297 District Attorney J.R. Dorsey,
who had been put in office with heavy oil worker support two years prior, toured
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the oil fields on September 21 also in an attempt to alleviate public distress.298
He concluded that “the reports of lawlessness...have been exaggerated” and
instead “the record for law and order is excellent.”299 Roadblocks as well as
violence on the highways and in the oil fields persisted despite the consolations.
Independent oil workers and foremen at operational derricks,
disassociated with the Oil Producers Association, often working small leases in
western Kern, did not fare well under strike conditions. Members of the strike’s
“law and order committees” visited one such operator the night of September 21,
stopped his wife and their nine year old daughter near Pentland Junction in
Maricopa and shot up their vehicle after another heated debate on the
highway.300 In another instance two oil workers on the Pacific Oil Company
lease in Coalinga were severely beaten, one of them crippled, with “claw
hammers” by Kern County oil strikers, simply for working a lease unaffected by
the strike.301 Local reports indicated that Coalinga, the south-western tip of
Fresno County, was “being overrun by strange strikers from the Taft-Bakersfield
fields.”302 Oil strikers could hardly leave that region alone. They returned days
later with another “fusillade,” firing round after round at the Pacific Oil derricks
where workmen toiled through the night.303 Violence in the Coalinga district
continued to be particularly bad throughout the remainder of the strike in large
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part because Fresno County sheriff W.F. Jones had not been propped up by the
union and was therefore more willing to clash with “law and order committees”
when they enacted violence against workmen and county residents.304
“Law and order committee” violence always took a scattergun approach.
Any oilmen not in line with the strike were susceptible to vigilante violence, even
though the overwhelming majority of them were neither scabs nor strike
breakers. The heated altercations on the highways often revolved around
whether or not people being stopped in the strike zone were saboteurs,
bootleggers or agitators, but often violence was enacted against those that did
not fit into any of these categories and simply had refused to recognize the
authority of the “law and order committees.”
Enough of these accounts finally made their way back to District Attorney
Dorsey, who then exclaimed that, “shootings on the highways must stop!”305
Union officials also joined in condemning the violence, and both articulated that
the “law and order committees” were not acting in accordance with their own
principles of patriotism.306 When Martin Madsen of the governor’s office met with
“law and order committee” members in the fields they responded by arguing that
“the law was read to use” and that any American citizen could stop a vehicle on
public highways provided they maintain “law and order.”307 Legionnaires that
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comprised these committees were clearly improvising what their Americanism
meant.308
By mid-October the strike was over a month old and Kern County
residents had grown weary. One editorial fondly reflected on the war-period
when capital and labor were forced into industrial harmony and “there was a daily
manifestation of patriotism of the highest order.”309 Oil strikers were attempting
to rally their movement around such patriotism, but it proved to be a difficult
maneuver.
Out of sheer desperation, “law and order committees” took to intimidating
local news outlets such as the Shafter Progress just outside Bakersfield. Local
editor H.M. Calkins had been reporting on the increasing violence throughout the
strike zone when “committee members” visited him to decry that “through the
articles in question he was injuring their cause.”310 Calkins replied that, “he did
not represent either side in the oil strike controversy, but as long as lawlessness
was practiced here he would give the same publicity.”311 Calkins’s skepticism of
the strikers’ “moral and sober” cause was not isolated. As the strike drew to a
close and Yarrow asked for merchant endorsements within his final barrage of
telegrams to Labor Secretary Davis, Kern County merchants officially declared
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themselves non-aligned despite having aided the movement in the early
weeks.312
The Americanism of the oil workers movement had limited their growth at
the same time it had failed to garner the full embrace of the Kern County
community. The violence surrounding the 1921 oil strike is not difficult to
uncover, but its ideological underpinning is difficult to diagnose. It best
resembled the violence the American Legion would become known for as the
decade ensued, directed towards those that broke with the perceived conduct of
“proper citizenship.” Nehls states, “Vigilantism, therefore, was part of the
conversation the Legion had both within its own bounds and with society at large
about the nature of American nationalism and good citizenship.313 As we have
seen, the conservative design of the oil workers movement hobbled its options,
and as the identity of Americanism, that the majority of strikers embraced over
class, failed to pay the same dividends it had during the Wilsonian era,
vigilantism was adopted as an anecdote for deteriorating economic conditions.
When the strike concluded on November 3 and strikers were “hamstrung by their
frequent pronouncements of patriotism, duty, and deference,” there was no mass
pull to the left, instead a portion of oil workers and former strike supporters turned
to the conservative nativism of the Klan.314 An organization that would not offer
ailing workers class consolation, but would at least offer infinite scapegoating and
a deeper perpetuation of lawlessness.
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5.4 More American-than-thou
The second iteration of the Klan in 1920s America was the closest the
organization came to mainstream. Recent historiography has shown that
contrary to the popular perception of the Klan, as overtly southern and anti-black,
the Klan of the 1920s was strikingly wide-spread on the national level and
primarily animated by what members saw as violations of Americanism.315 The
nebulous nature of these transgressions aided the second Klan’s growth. In
post-war America, acts that deviated from the nation’s perceived “moral code”
could be easily found, ranging from radicalism and drinking to immigrants and
promiscuity. The Klan sought to reestablish an “idealized American identity,” one
that had been menaced by the social turbulence of the war period.
The Klan’s presence in the San Joaquin Valley during this period has
been widely studied.316 However, not enough has been done to provoke the idea
of a rich historical overlap between the 1921 oil strike and the rise of the Klan in
Kern County.317 It remains difficult to escape the feeling that such an overlap
exists, particularly when it comes to the larger discourse surrounding
Americanism, what it should look like and how it should operate. The oil workers
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movement had embraced the identity of Americanism, and in many ways had
placed it above their conception of class and labor unionism. When this
maneuvering finally led to the movement’s capitulation, the fallout left oil workers
and supportive community members to ponder what Americanism meant and
what it was good for.
The fallout from the strike was severe. Union secretary E.B. Daniel wired
Labor Secretary Davis and decried the treatment of oil workers returning back to
work. He stated, “approximately 70% of the strikers have been re-employed, but
the remaining 30% are being badgered and in many instances blacklisted openly,
and even a large percentage of those working are continually being intimidated
by petty officialdom!”318 The strike had been called off for “industrial peace,” but
little peace would be found in the western oil fields for the ensuing months.
After the strike the majority of oil workers migrated south to the oil fields of
Los Angeles where the communities of La Brea and Signal Hill had begun
dominating the industry’s output.319 However, another contingent stayed in Kern,
joined the ranks of the Klan and by February 1922 were actively doubling down
on the vigilantism that had marked the strike period. Through winter and spring
the westside oil districts were beset with “hooded terror” ranging from beatings to
tar and featherings, as Klan members publicly announced, “we demand that the
town of Taft and the county of Kern be made clean, and that happiness and
welfare be safeguarded.”320 When W.E.B. Dubois spoke of the 1920s Klan in
America he argued, “total depravity, human hate and shaden-fruede do not fully
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explain the mob spirit in this land. Before the wide eyes of the mob is ever the
shape of fear.”321 The Kern Klan was afraid the social fabric of the community
was ripping, and they sought to articulate what their “ideal” form of American
citizenship should look like and how its citizens should behave.
Quam-Wickham’s small segment on the Klan requires greater unpacking.
She argues that, “Night riders targeted local merchants and residents who had
supported the strike, as well as oil workers who had been blacklisted for their
strike activities.”322 However, she also concedes that a significant portion of oil
strikers were the ones turning to the Klan.323 It appears that the Klan’s “cleaning”
up of Kern was primarily an in-house procedure. The majority of their violence
was directed towards individuals, former strikers or otherwise, that had been
actively violating the “moral” dimension of Americanism exhibited during the
strike. Eli Andrews was targeted for “bootlegging and peddling drugs” during the
strike.324 Dr. Dwight Mason was targeted for alleged adultery.325 Druggist
George Bowman of Taft was severely beaten and “dragged through an oil sump”
for allegedly selling alcohol prescriptions to oil workers during the strike.326
George Pettye was beaten for alleged adultery, while others were dropped out in
the middle of the desert and told to “seek employment.”327
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A Hanford Sentinel editorial stated,
It is not entirely a far-fetched theory that the loose action of Kern county
officials during the oil strikes, when they permitted misuse of authority by
those not intended to serve as peace officers, has in a measure influenced
the present unlawful situation in the Kern town. When the agents of justice
fail to do their full duty, the fabric of common sense law is torn.328
In both cases the “misuse of authority” was taken up in the name of Americanism
and the perceived need to police the Kern County region on the principles of
“proper citizenship.”
Nehls argues that both the American Legion and the Ku Klux Klan offered
competing visions of Americanism through the 1920s.329 Given that both
organizations were prone to vigilantism and racist thought, the key difference
was an ideological one. In theory the Legion believed in “tolerance,” and “the
premise that it was most desirable to link individuals within American society.”330
While the Klan obviously believed in the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race, but
also the “Protestant values of thrift, self-denial, sobriety, and strong work
ethic.”331
Between 1921 and 1922, these competing visions of Americanism took
hold in Kern County, and contextualizing them against the 1921 strike is critical.
The oil workers movement was completely consumed by the Americanism of the
Legion, yet it failed to grow beyond the local level and clearly failed to obtain the
goals of the strike. It is important to note that there was no large-scale fall from
grace for former striking Legionnaires and supportive community members.
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During the fallout from the strike, it was not as if every single oil worker
disavowed the Americanism of the Legion for that of the Klan. However, there
was a portion that did.332
When interviewed after the strike Walter Yarrow exclaimed there had been
“a lack of solidarity among oil workers.”333 Yet, internal rifts within the oil worker’s
movement were never between conservatism and radicalism or class and
Americanism, as we have seen, progressive unionism much less radicalism,
were never seriously or effectively considered when it came to the strike’s design
or methods. Discussions in Kern revolved around Americanism, and the fallout
from the strike demonstrated that at least some in the region were willing to
adopt a starker interpretation.
Kern County Legion posts struggled to rally Legionnaires after the strike
as they faced the threat of the Klan’s Americanism. Legion leaders encouraged
members in “waking up the ‘buddies’ and impressing them with the necessity of
keeping their charters alive.”334 Leaders could hardly ignore the “lack of energy”
felt throughout the posts, but were still determined to make their presence the
dominant authority on the local level.335 Right into summer news headlines
exclaimed, “Americanism is the Topic in Taft!”336
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The sentiment of those Legionnaires that were willing to abandon their
Americanism for that of the Klan was best articulated by Taft City Marshall
Roscoe Steele. When asked about his affiliation with the Klan he argued,
Yes, I was formerly a member of the Ku Klux Klan, and I joined the Klan in
Santa Barbara and was obligated as were several others. I went into it
with my eyes open, and am not trying to pass the buck along. I am glad to
see that some of the boys are interested enough in me as to want to know
my stand in the matter, so in justice to them I will attempt to give my
opinion. There is absolutely nothing in the obligation of the Ku Klux Klan
that is un-American, in fact it tends to make a man a better American and
if the American Legion had a little more Klannish spirit and less
selfishness it would be 100 percent American as is the Ku Klux Klan.337
The competing visions of Americanism that were present in Kern County
at this time should demonstrate something about how we conceive of American
conservatism as a social force. Nehls argues that the Legion represented a
precursor to “class and colorblind interpretation of citizenship that would be vital
to American conservatism through the rest of the 20th century.”338 In large part,
this was the case in Kern County. However, while Alicia Rodriquez shows that
the Kern Klan essentially folded in on itself amid strong local pushback, she also
challenges us to understand that affiliation with the Klan never negatively
impacted members' lives. Kern County members went on to hold prominent
positions in other organizations, lead financially successful lives and were easily
subsumed back into their communities.339 Rick Perlstein reminds us that “In fact,
the ‘far right’ was never that far from the American mainstream.”340 The Kern
County case should demonstrate that when conservatism is the dominant driving
337
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social force of a movement, it should not be assumed that it will automatically
operate with the “slow and steady” momentum historians once ascribed to it.
5.5 Conclusion
The Kern County Oil Strike of 1921 and its fallout manage both
bewilderment and rapture. The entire situation did not occur in a vacuum, it sat
at the volatile crossroads of a postwar post-Red Scare America, saturated with
WWI veterans returning from “over there,” Wobblies, Prohibition, shifting
permutations of capitalism and a particularly conservative Harding administration
and rising Republican regime. The case study grew beyond the strike itself and
became much more about how these elements bounced off one another and
shaped the ensuing decade.
Kern County oil workers were no different from other union men in that the
war-period had been good to them. American capitalism had undergone drastic
changes almost overnight with the onset of American involvement in WWI, and
by 1921 these changes were being undone at a similar pace before Harding and
the Republican retreat from strong state intervention in labor relations. The
“great strike wave” of 1919-1922 was labor’s response.
The oil workers’ movement had unique flair. Strikers crafted an image of
“patriotic unionism,” underpinned by a faith in the federal government, but also by
the conservatism of the American Legion. Thousands of Legionnaires filled the
ranks of the strike, adorned “badges of red, white and blue,” enforced prohibition
and gambling laws, disdained radicalism and immigration, and “pinned their faith
to Uncle Sam’s signature.” The strike lasted six weeks and paralyzed the state
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oil industry. It did not end in gruesome class warfare like had been seen mere
months earlier in the coal mines of West Virginia, but rather in ideological
confusion and despair. The oil workers’ movement never fully embraced a class
identity, instead it embraced the burgeoning conservative identity of
Americanism. This effectively hobbled the growth of the movement in several
ways, and ultimately left it with a lack of alternatives besides capitulation. Upon
the strike’s conclusion and despite the fact that their movement’s conservative
design and identity had not led to any form of success, there was no mass pull to
the left on the part of oil workers in the San Joaquin Valley. On the contrary a
portion of workers and supporters of the strike turned to the nativism of the Klan.
This analysis first looks to contextualize the Kern County Oil Strike and its
surrounding events, and then looks to place it alongside larger historical
discourses. It sits most broadly and comfortably at the intersection between
labor or class and identity, but it should also provoke a current dialogue
regarding American conservatism. Questions that plague the case of the Kern
County Oil Workers should be ones that echo through today. Why would a
worker choose to identify with a category outside of class, particularly during a
moment of labor unrest? Is a balance possible between a worker’s material
class conditions and their patriotic nationalism? Why is American nationalism an
overwhelmingly conservative force? What is the nature of the relationship
between American conservatism and labor, and what does this imply about the
conservative worker? Is patriotic nationalism a stable vehicle for making class
gains, and if so can a movement that adopts this strategy ever break with that
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identity? These questions should ring out for historians looking to make sense of
the most recent talk of nationalism despite obviously living in global world, and
they should draw attention to the mindset of workers, already living in a deindustrialized country, that now hear the cry for the nation and appear willing to
answer it, once again in spite of their material class interests.
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